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RECLAIM THIS! GETTING CREDIT SELLER RIGHTS IN 
BANKRUPTCY RIGHT 
Lawrence Ponoroff * 
INTRODUCTION 
The oxymoronically titled Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA" or "2005 amend-
ments")1 has received considerable attention since its passage, 
and considerably less than all of it is positive.2 By even a neutral 
account, the bill is clumsily drafted, 3 unnecessarily prolix,4 inter-
* Samuel F. Fegtly Chair in Commercial Law, The University of Arizona James E. 
Rogers College of Law. 
1. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
11 U.S.C.). BAPCPA became fully effective for cases filed on or after October 17, 2005. Id. 
§ 1501, 119 Stat. at 216. 
2. Professor Mechele Dickerson points out: 
Although the bill garnered the support of a substantial number of Democrats 
and Republicans in Congress, virtually all bankruptcy and commercial law 
professors at all major U.S. law schools (including this author), all major non-
partisan national bankruptcy organizations, and the national organization of 
bankruptcy judges argued that the bill was ill-conceived, poorly drafted, and 
appeared to benefit only the credit card lobby. 
A. Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology, & Beyond, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1861, 1866 n.29 (2006). 
3. See Jean Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005 
Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 93, 97 ("The problems 
with the 2005 Act are breathtaking. There are typos, sloppy choices of words, hanging 
paragraphs and inconsistencies."); Ralph Brubaker, Supreme Court Adopts the Forward-
Looking Approach to Projected Disposable Income in Chapter 13, 30 BANKR. L. LE'ITER 2, 
Aug. 2010, available at Westlaw 30 No. 8 BLL 2 ("BAPCPA is a poorly drafted statute. 
What's more, Congress knew that it was a poorly drafted statute and was warned repeat-
edly about all of the difficulties that it would pose for the courts .... Congress just did not 
care, though, and enacted BAPCPA without attempting to fix even the most glaring draft-
ing gaffes."); John Rao, Testing the Limits of Statutory Construction Doctrines: Decon-
structing the 2005 Bankruptcy Act, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1427, 1427 (2006) (''Most bankruptcy 
practitioners, scholars, and courts readily agree on one thing: the 2005 Bankruptcy Act ... 
is poorly drafted."); Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Represent-
ing Consumers Under the "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005," 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 191-92 (2005) (noting that bankruptcy experts drafted 
previous amendments to title 11 and that BAPCPA drafters refused to make technical cor-
rections to the statute); see also In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 529 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) 
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nally inconsistent,5 and annealed in a cauldron of special interest 
pressures.6 The legislative history is scane and what does exist is 
(stating the 2005 law's changes are "confusing, overlapping, and sometimes self. 
contradictory" and "introduce new and undefined terms that resemble, but are different 
from, established terms that are well understood"). 
4. Often pointed to as the prime example is the almost impenetrably dense means 
test, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)-(3) (2012), providing for no less than three layers of screening 
in Chapter 7 cases: presumed abuse, rebuttal, and totality of the circumstances. Professor 
David Gray Carlson, based on his study of the means test's impact, has concluded that the 
result of the huge investment of time and effort that goes into the test has, at best, had no 
effect, and, arguably, has actually encouraged bankruptcy abuse. David Gray Carlson, 
Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
223, 227 (2007). However, other examples abound, such as the amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 
365(b)(l), which prior to BAPCPA, read in relevant part: "[T]he trustee may not assume 
such contract or lease unless ... the trustee cures, or provides adequate assurance that 
the trustee will promptly cure, such default." 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A) (2000), amended by 
11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). To that sentence BAPCPA added the fol-
lowing incomprehensible language: 
[O]ther than a default that is a breach of a provision relating to the satisfac-
tion of any provision (other than a penalty rate or penalty provision) relating 
to a default arising from any failure to perform nonmonetary obligations un-
der an unexpired lease of real property, if it is impossible for the trustee to 
cure such default by performing nonmonetary acts at and after the time of 
assumption, except that if such default arises from a failure to operate in ac-
cordance with a nonresidential real property lease, then such default shall be 
cured by performance at and after the time of assumption in accordance with 
such lease, and pecuniary losses resulting from such default shall be compen-
sated in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph. 
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 328, 119 Stat. 23, 100 (2005). References to the "Code" or the "Bank-
ruptcy Code" herein are to the current law of Bankruptcy as found in Title 11 of the Unit-
ed States Code and amended through Pub. L. No. 112-106, approved April 5, 2012. 
5. As one of several examples, consider section 521(i) of the Federal Bankruptcy 
Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2012). Pursuant to section 521(i)(1), if an individual debtor 
in a voluntary case under Chapter 7 or 13 fails to file all of the information required under 
section 521(a)(1) within forty-five days after the date of the filing of the petition, the case 
shall be "automatically dismissed" effective on the forty-sixth day after the date of the fil-
ing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1) (2012). Section 521(i)(2) then allows any party in 
interest to flle a motion seeking an order of dismissal-presumably of the case that has 
already been automatically dismissed. Id. § 521(i)(2). This raises the prospect that a case 
that was automatically dismissed (or should have been) might actually proceed to dis-
charge before the missing mandated information is discovered and acted upon. This 
anomaly has led Judge Jay Cristo! to express his frustration with "automatic" dismissal in 
poetic fashion. See In re Riddle, 344 B.R. 702, 703 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006) (one of the cou-
plets in the poem reads: "How can any person know what the docket does not show?"). The 
constitutionality of automatic dismissal has also been questioned. See Gregory Germain, 
Due Process in Bankruptcy: Are the New Automatic Dismissal Rules Constitutional?, 13 U. 
PA. J. Bus. L. 547, 549 (2011). 
The ambiguities and uncertainties created by BAPCPA, moreover, were not limited to 
the consumer side of the field. For example, there is a split of authority as to whether sec-
tion 1115 of the Code, added by the 2005 amendments, exempts individual Chapter 11 
debtors from the absolute priority rule. For example, see Dill Oil Co. v. Stephens (In re 
Stephens), 704 F. 3d 1279, 1281, 1283-85 (lOth Cir. 2013), and cases cited therein. 
6. Many critics of BAPCPA argued that the credit card industry was the biggest ben-
eficiary of the act. Both Senator Dick Durbin and Representative Jim McDermott suggest-
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less than altogether clear or helpful.8 Together, these factors have 
frequently rendered the traditional judicial function in applica-
tion of the law; namely, ascertaining (or at least beginning by as-
certaining) congressional intent, an exercise in futility. 9 To say 
ed during the floor debates that the bill was bought and paid for by the consumer credit 
industry; especially the credit card industry. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S2216 (daily ed. 
Mar. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin); 151 CONG. REC. H2084 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) 
(statement of Rep. McDermott). 
A case can be made, however, that no lender group fared better under BAPCPA than the 
auto lenders, who among other things, were rewarded with a prohibition against modifica-
tion in Chapter 13 if the vehicle in question was acquired for personal use and within two 
and a half years of filing (otherwise, within one year). See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9) (2012); 
see also William C. Whitford, A History of the Automobile Lender Provisions of BAPCPA, 
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 143, 144 (arguing that automobile lenders are likely to benefit more 
than any other group under BAPCPA). In any case, the late Senator Paul Wellstone, the 
lone senator to vote against the bill, summed up the view of many in the bankruptcy field 
when he offered this comment with respect to an earlier iteration of the bill that eventual-
ly was passed as BAPCPA: 
You are hard pressed to find a bankruptcy judge that supports this legisla-
tion. You are hard pressed to find a bankruptcy law professor, a bankruptcy 
expert of any kind, anywhere, any place in the U.S.A. that backs this bill. 
This bill was written for the lender. It is that simple. 
147 CONG. REC. 13,139, 13,140 (2001) (statement of Sen. Wellstone). On the other hand, 
Professor Dickerson has offered a thoughtful explanation and critique of BAPCPA that is 
much more nuanced and complex than the single industry capture exposition, although 
even she concedes the criticality of the role played by the consumer credit lobby. See Dick-
erson, supra note 2, at 1861-63. 
7. See DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. Americas v. Miller (In re Miller), 570 F.3d 633, 
639 (5th Cir. 2009) ("Even if we were to seek guidance on BAPCPA from somewhere out-
side its plain language, we would be stopped by a dearth of plain legislative history."). 
8. See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. J.L. 485, 485-93 (2005) (detailing the leg-
islation's history going back to its original antecedents in the dissent to the National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission's 1997 Report); NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW ·COMM'N, 
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS FINAL REPORT (1997), available at http://govinfo. 
library.unt.edu/nbrc/reportcont.html. 
Generally speaking, there is no question that motivation behind the legislation was to 
curb the use of the bankruptcy laws as a form of debt management by people who in fact 
could afford to pay all or a substantial portion of their debts. There is, however, very little 
specific legislative guidance concerning the intended purpose for and operation of most of 
the provisions of BAPCPA themselves, and particularly those relating to business cases. 
See Coop v. Frederickson (In re Frederickson), 545 F.3d 652, 656 (8th Cir. 2008); see also 
In re McNabb, 326 B.R. 785, 789 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (''Legislative history is virtually 
useless as an aid to understanding the language and intent of BAPCPA."). 
9. Since the mid-1980s, a significant body of literature has developed exploring al-
ternative approaches to statutory interpretation. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to 
the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 256 
(1992). On the most traditional account, embraced in innumerable judicial opinions, the 
role of courts in applying statutory language is to determine the intent of the legislature. 
Under an intentionalist view, the court might consider a wide variety of legislative mate-
rials in order to determine the intent behind the statute as promulgated. See Patricia M. 
Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 
1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 301 (1990) (ar-
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the least, it is difficult to discern that which, in all likelihood, 
does not and has never existed in a uniform or coherent fashion. 10 
Nonetheless, since enactment of BAPCPA, courts have labored 
gamely to make sense of its provisions, which, in any number of 
instances, are inscrutably obscure, and seem to lack any inher-
guing that the court's primary consideration when presented with a statute is to "advance 
rather than impede or frustrate the will of Congress"). A narrow variation of intentional-
ism, sometimes referred to as textualism and almost always identified with Justice Scalia, 
restricts the search for legislative intent to the law as written. See Antonin Scalia, Com-
mon-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Inter-
preting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 
23-25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). On the other end of the intentionalism spectrum is an 
approach, sometimes called purposivism, which goes behind inquiry into what the legisla-
ture "had in mind" to determine what the legislature was ultimately seeking to accom-
plish. Purposivism is frequently identified with the Legal Process Movement. See HENRY 
M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
In contrast to the standard models of statutory interpretation, which have been dubbed 
"archeological" in focus, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 20, 22-25 (1988), is a school of thought closely associated with Professors 
Eskridge and Frickey, known as dynamic statutory interpretation. See, e.g., William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990). Taking a pragmatic perspective, the adherents of this theory 
abandon the backward-looking archeological approach in favor of what has been described 
as a "nautical model," Aleinikoff, supra, at 33-36, in which the legislature launches the 
ship, but the courts chart the voyage taking into account contemporary needs and consid-
erations. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 73-74 (1990) (sug-
gesting the most important object of statutory interpretation is to attain the best results 
for society through practical reasoning). And yet, even the most devout proponents of dy-
namic statutory interpretation acknowledge that when the statutory text is clear, it is by 
far the most important consideration and will ordinarily control absent significant changes 
in the social and legal order that call for a more evaluative perspective. See, e.g., Daniel A. 
Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO L.J. 281, 309 (1989) 
("When the statutory command is unclear, [courts may bring] contemporary values to 
bear. But when the statutory language and legislative history make the statute's meaning 
unmistakable, such 'interpretation' is more in the nature of a partial repeal."); Richard A. 
Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Con-
stitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189 (1986) (explaining that if the meaning of the 
statute is clear, judges must obey). 
10. I make this assertion in relation to BAPCPA, and the process attending its enact-
ment, and not as a more general commentary on the legislative process that might be tak-
en as subscribing to the public choice theory that legislation is always an incoherent com-
promise and Congress has no mind of its own. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, 
and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1994); see 
generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIPP. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 88-115 (1991) 
(providing a helpful summary of the public choice literature in relation to statutory inter-
pretation). On the other hand, as Judge Learned Hand pointed out over fifty years ago, the 
point does remain true that if by legislative "intent" we mean what one person or any 
group of people "had in mind," this is inherently unknowable. United States v. Klinger, 
199 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952). 
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ently clear reason. 11 Thoughtful commentators have undertaken 
to offer useful insight and analysis to help guide that effort. 12 
Overall, however, these efforts have fallen, and will continue to 
fall, short in relation to any number of provisions of BAPCP A. 
This is because they entail a stoic and estimable, but ultimately 
vain, attempt to interpret statutory text that is, in some instanc-
es, impenetrably vague or simply incomplete, or, in other instanc-
es, confounds essential bankruptcy policy. A coherent and intelli-
gible expression of legislative intent that might have shed some 
light in the process is nowhere to be found. 13 Although the compe-
tition is unquestionably stiff, in perhaps no substantive area of 
the field have these observations been truer than in the efforts to 
deconstruct and rationally apply the changes BAPCPA wrought 
on an area of commercial law and practice that was already em-
broiled in confusion and controversy; namely, sellers' right of rec-
lamation. 
The 2005 amendments to the right of reclamation are a puzzle. 
Through no fault of their own, courts have creatively, but unsuc-
cessfully, attempted to untangle the Gordian Knot into which 
BAPCPA has tied the right of reclamation (and an ancillary new 
remedy for credit sellers of goods) in bankruptcy. 14 This is partly 
due to the fact that, at some level, courts simply cannot accept 
that the statute means what it says, or, in certain cases, accept 
the implications of applying the statute to mean what it says. 
Courts, of course, are constrained in their efforts to minimize the 
chaos given the fact that, by dint of their structural and institu-
11. See In re Perfetto, 361 B.R. 27, 31 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2007), in which the court mused: 
Such incongruous results appear throughout BAPCPA, creating the potential 
for many anomalies that were either never considered or completely ignored 
by the architects of this law. Left to deal with such issues, but with no guid-
ance provided by the seemingly myopic drafters, courts are and will be re-
quired to fashion common sense approaches to achieve order out of the confu-
sion unwittingly created by Congress. 
12. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bufford & Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Problems in the 
2005 Bankruptcy Amendments, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2008); Richard Levin & Alesia Ran-
ney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 11: The Significant Business Provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 603 (2005); A. Thomas Small, If You Fix It, They Will Come-A New Playing Field for 
Small Business Bankruptcies, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 981 (2005); Eugene R. Wedoff, Major 
Consumer Bankruptcy Effects of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 31. 
13. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
14. That remedy is the new administrative expense priority in § 503(b)(9) for the val-
ue of goods sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of the debtor's business in the twenty-
day period prior to the filing of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (2012). 
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tional responsibilities, they must be honest brokers and play the 
hand that the legislature deals them, regardless (continuing the 
metaphor) of how rotten the cards. 15 Those of us who comment on 
the law, however, are not constrained by the parameters associ-
ated with playing a formal role in the constitutional system of 
government, and we do not have to decide real cases between ac-
tual litigants. We have the prerogative and the privilege, there-
fore, to go beyond the positive law and openly (but hopefully con-
structively) critique legislative enactments that either defy 
rational interpretation or introduce systemic disharmony into the 
larger regime. We have license to ask the "right" questions; and, 
in this instance, the right questions about reclamation are: (1) 
how does preferential treatment for reclaiming and other sellers 
of goods fit within the broader panoply of bankruptcy policies, 
separate and apart from the role the doctrine serves under state 
law; (2) how well does BAPCPA balance these considerations; and 
(3) if poorly, then how can and should credit seller remedies be 
crafted in bankruptcy to ensure that the interests of those sellers, 
and the various other parties with a stake in the bankruptcy case, 
are optimally coordinated and aligned? Those are the questions 
this article seeks to raise and begins to answer. 
In order to provide the context, Part I begins with an overview 
of the right of reclamation under both common law and the Uni-
form Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), and then also in a bankruptcy 
proceeding up to circa 2005. 16 Next, Part II chronicles the changes 
to the rules governing reclamation and reclamation-type claims 
in bankruptcy brought about under BAPCPA, and reviews the 
palmary efforts of courts to grapple with some of the key interpre-
tational curiosities that these revisions have spawned. In this 
15. The Supreme Court of the United States has been clear that where Congress has 
unambiguously drafted a particular provision, it is the court's sole function to enforce it 
according to its terms, not to undermine its effect. See Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 
U.S. 526, 534-36 (2004). The words of a statute cannot be ignored or jettisoned by courts 
looking to impose their own meaning, however logical that meaning, on a statutory 
scheme. See, e.g., IUE-CWA v. Visteon Corp. (In re Visteon Corp.), 612 F.3d 210, 219-20 
(3d Cir. 2010) (construing the provision of section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code in accord-
ance with its plain language); see also supra note 9 (outlining different approaches to stat-
utory interpretation and referencing a preference for remaining faithful to the plain lan-
guage of the statue). 
16. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, AND NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: OFFICIAL TEXT AND COMMENTS 
(2013). 
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connection, this article emphasizes two points: (1) why the pre-
vailing judicial approaches to these kinds of credit seller claims in 
bankruptcy are, with a few exceptions, unsupportable under the 
terms of the statute as written; and (2) what are the larger, nega-
tive ramifications of such forced and unnatural interpretation. 
Finally, Part III sets forth an alternative way of thinking about 
and approaching credit seller claims (and the reclamation reme-
dy) in bankruptcy that coheres not simply with what historically 
have been the most compelling purposive objects of the right of 
reclamation, but also harmonizes the interaction of those objec-
tives with the unique policy considerations that are implicated 
once a bankruptcy case is filed. 
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A. The Common Law 
Ordinarily, a credit seller of goods has no special claim to the 
goods it sells unless the seller reserves a security interest in those 
goods. 17 A limited exception to this axiom existed at common law 
(and perhaps even earlier) for a seller who had been defrauded 
into delivering goods to an insolvent buyer. 18 Generally speaking, 
this right to "reclaim" required a showing that the buyer had mis-
represented its solvency to the selling creditor or, later in the de-
velopment of the right, to a third party (such as a credit reporting 
agency) on whose records the selling creditor relied. 19 Even 
though title and possession of the goods had passed to the buyer, 
in such a case the defrauded seller was entitled effectively to re-
17. The typical remedy in such a case would be an action for the price under U.C.C. 
section 2-709, which would, if successful, lead to a judgment and, only then, the ability to 
obtain a lien on the debtor's assets by levy and execution. U.C.C. § 2-709 (2013). 
18. For a much more complete historical account of the right of reclamation, as well as 
an analysis in support of a more or less expanded version of the remedy, see generally Pes-
ter Refining Co. v. Ethyl Corp. (In re Pester Refining Co.), 964 F.2d 842, 844 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(stating that reclamation is a rescissory "remedy, based upon the theory that the seller 
has been defrauded"); Larry T. Garvin, Credit, Information, and Trust in the Law of Sales: 
The Credit Seller's Right of Reclamation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 247 (1996) (detailing the statu-
tory history of reclamation, the U.C.C.'s formulation of the remedy of reclamation, and the 
state of reclamation case law at the time). 
19. See generally Robert Braucher, Reclamation of Goods from a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 
MICH. L. REV. 1281, 1282-83 (1967) (noting that it was generally assumed that insolvency 
without fraud or misrepresentation was not a basis for rescission and replevin, although 
such fraud could exist if the debtor knew payment was extremely unlikely and failed to 
disclose that fact). 
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scind the contract and recover the specific goods. In time, the 
right might also be triggered in the absence of a misrepresenta-
tion if the acquisition of the goods was part of a premeditated 
scheme to defraud, or if it could be shown that the debtor was 
hopelessly insolvent at the time of the purchase.20 The right tore-
claim the goods subject to the sale, when it existed, generally ex-
tended to indefinable proceeds in the event of resale or, where the 
goods were fungible in nature, had become commingled with like 
goods.21 
The only widely recognized exception to the seller's right of rec-
lamation was in cases where title to the goods had passed to a 
bona fide purchaser for value before the right to reclaim had been 
exercised.22 In general, however, this protected status was held 
not to extend either to a consensual inventory lender or to a levy-
ing creditor of the buyer.23 In the latter situation, this was true 
regardless of whether the credit was extended before or after the 
sale giving rise to the reclamation claim, unless the defrauded 
seller by its words or conduct had misled the levying creditor into 
believing that the buyer was the true owner of the goods.24 
Historically, the right to reclaim goods would be forfeited if not 
exercised diligently. 25 It was not, however, governed, as it later 
came to be, by a rigidly truncated period for demand, 26 and was 
also enforceable even in the event of the buyer's bankruptcy since 
20. Id. at 1283 (suggesting, "amid some dispute," substantial authority for this posi-
tion). 
21. Garvin, supra note 18, at 257. 
22. This was consistent with the long·recognized exception to the common law princi-
ple of nemo dat quod non habet whereby a party with voidable title might nonetheless 
pass good title in the market. See Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith 
Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1057-60 (1954); see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES 449 (9th ed. 1783) ("But [title] may also in some cases be transferred by 
sale, though the vendor hath none at all in the goods: for it is expedient that the buyer, by 
taking proper precautions, may at all events be secure of his purchase; otherwise all com-
merce between man and man must soon be at an end."). 
23. See infra note 28. 
24. Braucher, supra note 19, at 1283. Professor Garvin also points out that the scope 
of this exception was narrower at common law than it came to be under the U.C.C. Garvin, 
supra note 18, at 259-60 (noting that the attaching creditor and recipient of new security 
for an old debt were not included among those who qualified as a bonafide purchase for 
value). 
25. See, e.g., Leatherbury v. Connor, 23 A 684, 685 (N.J. 1892) (stating that sellers 
seeking to take advantage of the remedy must proceed with diligence). 
26. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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it was considered to be and treated as a valid pre-bankruptcy in-
terest in the debtor's property to which the trustee took subject.27 
Thus, at common law, the right of reclamation represented a 
powerful remedy not only against the debtor, but also against a 
wide variety of other claimants in the goods, including most 
claims based on prior consensualliens.28 
B. Codification 
The notion of affording special rights for sellers of goods who 
extended unsecured credit to insolvent buyers did not find its way 
into the Uniform Sales Act, though it was assumed to continue as 
a matter of suppletory common law.29 The first codification of the 
reclamation remedy occurred in connection with approval and 
adoption of Article 2 of the U.C.C.30 Specifically, U.C.C. section 2-
702(2) allows a credit seller31 to reclaim its goods from an insol-
27. See Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U.S. 631, 633 (1876); see also Frank R. Kennedy, The 
Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by 
Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 518, 549-54 (1960) (discussing the right of reclama· 
tion with respect to the rights oflien creditors in bankruptcy). 
28. Prior to Article 9's broad endorsement of a unitary security device and the "float-
ing lien" over inventory and receivables, chattel security law's concerns over the issue of 
ostensible ownership resulted in a very limited ability of inventory lenders to establish 
priority over after-acquired property without the necessity for extensive, technical, and 
burdensome on-going monitoring and paperwork. The history of how debtors and creditors 
overcame the common law's hostility to nonpossessory security interests is well told in 1 
GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965). Even after wide-
spread adoption of the U.C.C., some commentators argued it was a "commercial injustice" 
for a secured party to be preferred over the reclaiming seller when the secured party's 
claim to the goods was based solely on an after-acquired property clause. See, e.g., Law-
rence R. Small, The Remedy Provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A 
Practical Orientation, 4 GONZ. L. REV. 176, 189-91 (1969). It is, however, now a well-
accepted principle. See infra text accompanying notes 73 & 118. 
29. Richard M. Cieri & Jeffrey B. Ellman, Understanding Reclamation Claims in 
Bankruptcy: Hidden Complexity in a Simple Statute, 5 J. BANirn. L. & PRAC. 531, 533 & n.5 
(1996) (reviewing the most common elements of a reclamation claim cited by courts under 
U.C.C. section 2-702(2), some of which also required that the buyer still be in possession of 
the goods at the time demand is made). 
30. For an extensive history of the drafting of the Article 2 reclamation right see 
Braucher, supra note 19, at 1285-91. 
31. Courts have also created a right of reclamation for cash sellers (such as a case 
where payment for goods is made by a check that is later dishonored) out of U.C.C. section 
2-507(2) cmt. 3 and U.C.C. section 2-511(3). See In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 
840, 844-46 (W.D. Va. 1968); In re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309, 310-11 (E.D. Pa. 1962). 
However, U.C.C. section 2-403(1) gives voidable title to the cash buyer, meaning that the 
buyer, who holds voidable title, has the power to transfer good title to a good faith pur-
chaser for value. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (2013). At common law, and under the Uniform Sales 
Act, unpaid cash sellers generally prevailed over the claims of bona fide purchasers, in-
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vent buyer provided that demand is made within ten days after 
receipt of the goods. 32 As a practical matter, the statutory ten-day 
demand requirement limits the utility of the remedy to only the 
most vigilant vendors. However, upon a showing that the buyer 
misrepresented solvency in writing within the three months pre-
ceding delivery of the goods, 33 section 2-702(2) eliminates the ten-
day demand condition, thus expanding considerably both the 
scope and the impact of the credit seller's potential reclamation 
claim in these limited circumstances.34 
Although codification of credit sellers' reclamation rights has 
made the remedy a more self-activating one by eliminating the 
need for individual proof of fraud or intent to defraud in every 
case where the buyer receives goods on credit while insolvent, 
codification has also preempted case law development by limiting 
the scope of the right to circumstances where the conditions speci-
fied in the statute have been satisfied.35 U.C.C. section 2-702(3) 
further narrows the remedy by providing that exercise of the rec-
lamation right is in lieu of all other remedies against the goods.36 
This has meant the loss of the seller's ability to pursue additional 
eluding those who took by lien, because title was deemed not to pass to the buyer in a cash 
sale transaction until payment had been made. See Richard Arnold, Note, The Cash Sell-
er's Right of Reclamation Versus the Second Party's Floating Lien: Who is Entitled to Prior-
ity?, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 277, 277-78 (1978). For discussion of priority between pur-
chasers and a credit seller's express right of reclamation see infra text accompanying 
notes 7Q-73. 
32. U.C.C. § 2-702 (2002). Under Article 2, of course, the rights of sellers and buyers 
are not determined by the location of title. U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (2013). 
33. For more detailed discussion of the form which such misrepresentation of solvency 
might take, see Garvin, supra note 18, at 274-75. 
34. According to Official Comment 2 to former U.C.C. section 2-702(2), to fall within 
this exception to the "time limitation," the written statement of solvency must be ad-
dressed to the particular seller and "dated within three months of the delivery." U.C.C. § 
2-702(2) cmt. 2 (2002). 
35. The last sentence of U.C.C. section 2-702(2) expressly provides that a credit seller 
may not base a right to reclaim goods except in the manner provided in that subsection. 
U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (2013); see also CAMJRPC Elecs. v. Robertson (In re MGS Marketing), 
111 B.R. 264, 267 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (noting that all equitable and common law reme-
dies are supplanted). 
36. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) ("Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies 
with respect to them."). Comment 3 to U.C.C. section 2-702 recognizes that the right to 
reclaim goods constitutes a preference as against the buyer's other creditors and, there-
fore, exercise of the right bars all other remedies as to the goods involved. U.C.C. § 2-702 
cmt. 3; see also In re Ky. Flush Door Corp., 28 B.R. 808, 810 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (rec-
ognizing that section 2-702 provides the "sole remedy for a reclaiming seller"); Garvin, su-
pra note 18, at 275 (observing that this contrasts with the more liberal approach taken to 
election of remedies for both buyers and nonreclaiming sellers). 
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remedies, such as consequential damages or a deficiency judg-
ment. In addition, in the view of several courts, it has also en-
tailed loss of the right that existed at common law to retain a pri-
ority against identifiable proceeds of goods subject to reclamation, 
even as against unsecured creditors.37 Finally, as discussed be-
low,38 while the right itself finds expression in subsection (2) of 
U.C.C. section 2-702 against the buyer as the exclusive source of 
reclamation, subsection (3) further limits the breadth of the rec-
lamation right by delineating more broadly-than at common 
law-the scope of the seller's right vis-a-vis other parties who 
might claim an interest in the goods.39 This is also where the in-
tersection with bankruptcy law begins. 
Until 1966, the official text of U.C.C. section 2-702(3) made the 
seller's right to reclaim subject to the claims of both lien creditors 
and good faith purchasers. Therefore, not surprisingly, most of 
the early litigation in bankruptcy involving assertion of reclama-
tion rights pitted the aggrieved seller against the trustee acting 
in her hypothetical lien creditor capacity.40 In 1966, the drafters 
of the U.C.C. recommended the elimination of "lien creditors" 
from the class of persons to whose rights a reclaiming seller 
would be subject under section 2-702(3).41 Upon adoption by the 
states, this deletion seriously blunted the trustee's ability to de-
feat reclaiming sellers by resorting to the strong-arm powers. 
However, in that same year, Congress promulgated amendments 
37. See Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir. 1976); 
see also infra note 66. The basis of this argument is that U.C.C. section 2-702(2) sjleaks 
only of reclaiming goods, and says nothing of reclaiming proceeds. Of course, even if good 
as against unsecured creditors, such a priority would not in any case apply as against a 
purchaser or prior lienor because of the express subordination in section 2-702(3). See in-
fra text accompanying notes 70-73. While not altogether clear, it appears that the seller's 
right to reclaim fungible goods that have become commingled in a single bulk may contin-
ue under Article 2. See Conoco, Inc. v. Braniff, Inc. (In re Braniff, Inc.), 113 B.R. 745, 754-
55 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); Eighty-Eight Oil Co. v. Charter Crude Oil Co. (In re Charter 
Co.), 54 B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); infra text accompanying note 68. 
38. See infra text accompanying notes 70-73. 
39. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
40. Compare Johnston & Murphy Shoes, Inc. v. Meinhard Commercial Corp. (In re 
Mel Golde Shoes, Inc.), 403 F.2d 658, 660-61 (6th Cir. 1968) (defrauding seller's right to 
reclaim goods is superior to any right of attaching creditors under section 70(c) of the for-
mer Bankruptcy Act), with In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir. 1960) (determining 
the "strong arm" clause under section 70(c) of the former Bankruptcy Act was successfully 
used to defeat reclaiming seller under authority of U.C.C. section 2-702 (3)). 
41. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT No. 3, 
at 3 (1967). 
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to the former Bankruptcy Act that included the new standards 
(now incorporated into Bankruptcy Code section 545) for invali-
dating state-created priorities masquerading as statutory liens.42 
This immediately created an issue as to whether or not the 
U.C.C. section 2-702(2) reclamation right could be avoided as an 
offending statutory lien.43 
Relying on an expansive definition of the term "lien," and the 
fact that effectiveness of the rights conferred by U.C.C. section 2-
702(2) are rather obviously made contingent on the financial sol-
vency of the buyer, some bankruptcy courts reasoned that the 
statutory reclamation right represented precisely the kind of 
state-created priority that it was the policy of Bankruptcy Act 
section 67(c)(l)(At4 (the precursor to Code section 545(1)) to pre-
vent from interfering with the order of distribution in a bank-
ruptcy case.45 On the other hand, influenced by the longstanding 
equitable and common law antecedents of the Article 2 reclama-
tion right, panels for each of the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits analogized U.C.C. section 2-702(2) more to a state-created 
right of ownership than to a lien arising "solely by force of stat-
ute."46 Therefore, these courts ruled that the trustee was without 
42. See Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. Holzman (In re Telemart Enters.), 524 F.2d 761, 764 
(9th Cir. 1975) (discussing abuses that led to abolition of state-created priorities in section 
67(c) of the former Bankruptcy Act, originally adopted as part of the Chandler Act (Act of 
June 22, 1938, ch. 575 § 67(c), 52 Stat. 840, 877) amendments to the former Bankruptcy 
Act, and rewritten by Congress in 1966); Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, 80 Stat. 
268, 268-70 (amending sections 1, 17a, 64a(5), 67(b), 67(c), and 70c of the Bankruptcy Act, 
and for other purposes). 
43. See, e.g., In re Telemart Enters., 524 F.2d at 763. 
44. That provision provided: "(c)(1) The following liens shall be invalid against the 
trustee: (A) every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the insolvency of the 
debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A) (1964 & Supp. II 1967). 
45. See, e.g., Queensboro Farm Prods., Inc. v. Wetson's Corp. (In re Wetson's Corp.), 
17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 423, 426 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that, like other 
liens, because the reclamation right is extinguished upon payment of the debt, it falls 
within the definition of a "lien"). 
46. In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 516 (6th Cir. 1977) (emphasis omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); see also Bassett Furniture Indus. v. Wear (In re PFA Farm-
ers Market Ass'n), 583 F.2d 992, 1000 (8th Cir. 1978) (reasoning that the reclamation 
right involves the concept of "voidable title" rather than a state priority or a traditional 
lien); In re Telemart Enters., 524 F.2d at 765. Note, however, that in In re Wetson's Corp. 
the court rejected the argument that section 2-702(2) was the analogue of the common law 
right to reclaim since there was no right to reclaim at common law without specific proof 
of fraud. 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 426. 
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authority under section 67(c)(1)(A) to refuse an otherwise proce-
durally proper reclamation demand.47 
C. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
In an apparent effort to settle the controversy concerning the 
proper characterization of reclamation claims in bankruptcy,48 the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197849 contained a new provision that 
explicitly precluded the trustee from relying upon certain enu-
merated avoiding powers, including section 545, in order to defeat 
the claims of reclaiming sellers. 5° Bankruptcy Code section 546(c), 
as originally adopted,51 affirmatively stated that the trustee's 
rights and powers were subject to a seller's statutory or common 
law right to reclaim goods sold to the debtor provided that: (1) the 
goods were sold in the ordinary course of the seller's business; (2) 
the debtor was insolvent at the time the goods were received; (3) 
reclamation was demanded in writing within ten days of such re-
ceipt (twenty days if the ten-day period expired after the com-
mencement of the case); and (4) the goods were in the debtor's 
possession at the time the demand was received. 52 Placement of 
this provision within section 546, titled "Limitations on avoiding 
powers," is explicable, and should be understood, in light of the 
history described above regarding the uncertain validity of recla-
mation claims under the former Bankruptcy Act. 53 
47. Presumably, if the reclamation right is not a "statutory lien," then neither would 
the trustee's status as a bona fide purchaser of property under section 67(c)(1)(B), the pre-
cursor to section 545(2), have been of any greater avail to the trustee than the section 
67(1)(A) power to invalidate statutory liens arising upon the debtor's insolvency. 
48. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 86-87 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 
5872-73; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 372 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6328; 
see also Pester Ref. Co. v. Ethyl Corp. (In re Pester Ref. Co.), 964 F.2d 842, 845 (8th Cir. 
1992) (pointing out that section 546(c) was Congress' response to two decades of litigation 
between trustees and reclaiming sellers). 
49. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
50. Id. § 546(c), 92 Stat. at 2597. Section 546(c) also, by its original terms, barred a 
trustee from using his rights and powers under sections 544(a), 547, or 549 to avoid a rec-
lamation claim which satisfied the requirements of both state and common law, as modi-
fied by section 546(c). Id. 
51. When the context requires differentiation, the pre-BAPCPA version of section 
546(c) is referred to as "former section 546(c)" and the current version as "revised section 
546(c)." 
52. In re Child World, Inc., 145 B.R. 5, 7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
53. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 546, 92 Stat. at 2597; see supra text accompanying notes 42-
47. 
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The requirement of insolvency in section 546(c), unlike the lim-
itations concerning an ordinary course transaction and debtor's 
possession at the time demand was received, was already con-
tained, of course, in U.C.C. section 2-702(2). In In re Storage 
Technology Corp., however, the court rejected the creditors' ar-
gument that the more expansive U.C.C. definition of insolvency 
should apply in construing section 546(c).54 Instead, though con-
ceding some practical merit in the creditors' contention, the court 
ruled that overriding policy considerations nevertheless dictated 
that the narrower bankruptcy definition of balance sheet insol-
vency should provide the governing standard. 55 The differences 
between the two statutory provisions did not end there. In con-
trast with U.C.C. section 2-702(2), former section 546(c) required 
that the demand be in writing and drew no distinction for cases 
in which there had been a specific misrepresentation of insolven-
cy by the buyer. 56 Thus, from early on, reclamation in bankruptcy 
began to distance itself in key respects from both exercise of the 
right under state law and from the original objective of insulating 
reclamation claims from the trustee's avoiding powers. 
As the discussion above illustrates, because section 546(c) was 
more restrictive than U.C.C. section 2-702(2), some creditors 
maintained that former section 546(c) should not be interpreted 
so as to bar a seller who failed to establish compliance with its 
provisions from still attempting to establish entitlement to recov-
ery of the goods solely by virtue of U.C.C. section 2-702(2).57 Os-
54. Pike Tool & Grinding v. Storage Tech. Corp. (In re Storage Tech. Corp.), 48 B.R. 
862, 864, 866-67 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985); see U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(23) (2013) (defining insol-
vency in the equity sense of being unable to pay debts as they come due in addition to the 
traditional balance sheet sense of insolvency). 
55. In re Storage Tech. Corp., 48 B.R. at 866-67; accord Eagle Indus. Truck Mfg., Inc. 
v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (In re Continental Airlines, Inc.), 125 B.R. 415, 417 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 1991) (using balance sheet test of insolvency); Lawrence Pharm., Inc. v. Best Buy 
Drugs, Inc. (In re Best Buy Drugs, Inc.), 89 B.R. 997, 998 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988). A con-
trary result, which has been reached in other cases, has been criticized by some commen-
tators. See Ambico, Inc. v. AIC Photo, Inc. (In re AIC Photo, Inc.), 57 B.R. 56, 58-60 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); Benjamin Weintraub & Alan N. Resnick, From the Bankruptcy 
Courts: The Definition of ''Insolvent" for Reclamation Purposes-The Bankruptcy Code vs. 
the UCC, 19 UCC L.J. 170, 174---75 (1986) ("[I]t is difficult to justify the use of the UCC 
insolvency definition to construe 'insolvent' in Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code when 
a different definition of insolvency is contained in the Bankruptcy Code itself."). 
56. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1) (2000), with U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (2013). 
57. The other main differences between former section 546(c) and the U.C.C. were 
that section 546(c) did not waive the ten-day notice requirement if the buyer fraudulently 
misrepresents its solvency to the seller, and section 546(c) specified that notice must be in 
writing. See, e.g., In re Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc., 141 B.R. 265, 267 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992) 
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tensibly, the argument went that, as a limitation on the trustee's 
avoiding powers, section 546(c) should be read only as creating a 
"safe harbor" for a reclamation seller who satisfied its require-
ments, and not as detailing a further limitation on the circum-
stances under which a right of reclamation might be recognized in 
bankruptcy.58 Under this construction, while noncompliance with 
section 546(c) would concededly entail loss of its impervious 
shield against application of the trustee's avoiding powers, auto-
matic disallowance of the reclamation claim would not necessarily 
follow. Instead, a seller would retain its pre-bankruptcy interest 
in the goods subject to whatever avoidance firepower the trustee 
could muster.59 Given the existence of substantial authority for 
the proposition that U.C.C. section 2-702(2) is not a statutory lien 
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act predecessor to section 
545(1), if this view of the scope of former section 546(c) had been 
widely accepted, there is ample reason to believe that numerous 
reclamation claims that satisfied state but not federal definitional 
standards would have been afforded recognition in a bankruptcy 
case.
60 
This contention, however-that the seller's failure to satisfy 
former section 546(c) should not alone serve to relieve the trustee 
of the burden of establishing the applicability of one of the speci-
fied avoiding powers, including invalidity under section 545-was 
met with little success in the courtroom.61 Perhaps the primary 
explanation as to why this otherwise plausible argument was 
found wanting is that the legislative history of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act rather strongly evinces a congressional recognition of, 
(explaining these differences and citing authorities supporting this proposition). 
58. See, e.g., Hitachi Denshi Am., Ltd. v. Rozel Indus. (In re Rozel Indus.), 74 B.R. 
643, 644-46 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) (rejecting this argument). 
59. In essence, this view would have rendered section 546(c) a nonexclusive, although 
self-executing, remedy for a seller seeking to reclaim goods from a debtor. See, e.g., Farm-
ers Rice Milling Co. v. Hawkins (In re Bearhouse, Inc.), 84 B.R. 552, 559-60 (Bankr. W.D. 
Ark. 1988) (regarding right to reclamation other than upon strict compliance with section 
546(c)). 
60. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (explaining the existence of sub-
stantial authority for the proposition that U.C.C. section 2-702(2) is not a statutory lien 
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act predecessor to section 545(1)). 
61. See United Beef Packers v. Lee (In re A.G.S. Food Sys.), 14 B.R. 27, 28-29 (Bankr. 
D.S.C. 1980); see also John P. Finan, Reclamation Sellers and the Bankruptcy Trustee: Ra-
tionality v. the Language of Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 92 COM. L.J. 329, 334 
(1987) (supporting the argument that section 546(c) should not be construed as an exclu-
sive remedy). 
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and desire to end the debate and litigation over, the issue of 
whether U.C.C. section 2-702(2) was an avoidable statutory lien.62 
Put in that context, former section 546(c) was reasonably inter-
preted initially as answering that inquiry in the affirmative, but 
then carving out a limited exception where the state or common 
law reclamation claimant could also show compliance with the 
additional substantive requirements enumerated in former sec-
tion 546(c). Accordingly, the overwhelming majority of the courts 
that addressed the issue treated former section 546(c) as the sole 
and exclusive remedy for a seller seeking to reclaim goods from 
the estate of a bankrupt debtor. 63 In so doing, these courts estab-
lished early on that section 546(c) conferred rights independent 
of, or certainly at least not wholly coincident with, state law. 
Procedurally, an action to reclaim goods from the estate was 
treated as a contested matter and, therefore, initially brought be-
fore the bankruptcy court by motion. 64 The burden of proof as to 
the affirmative elements of the seller's right to the relief sought, 
including the key issues of the debtor's insolvency and timeliness 
of the demand, was on the moving party. Additionally, the peti-
tioning seller had to identify the goods remaining in the debtor's 
possession as of the time of receipt of the reclamation demand, 65 
and, if later disposed of, had to be able to trace the proceeds of re-
sale in order to be able to maintain any hope of recovering specific 
property from the estate. 66 However, even in jurisdictions that 
62. See supra note 48. For a case analyzing that legislative history in the context of 
this particular argument see B. Berger Co. v. Contract Interiors, Inc. (In reContract Interi-
ors, Inc.), 14 B.R. 670, 673-74 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981). 
63. See, e.g., Flav-0-Rich, Inc. v. Rawson Food Serv., Inc. (In re Rawson Food Serv., 
Inc.), 846 F.2d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 1988); Plastic Distrib. Corp. v. Koro Corp. (In re Koro 
Corp.), 20 B.R. 241, 242-43 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1982); In re Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc., 141 B.R. 
265, 267 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992); Fitzgerald Buick, Inc. v. Rea Keech Buick, Inc. (In re Rea 
Keech Buick, Inc.), 139 B.R. 625, 628 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992); Chemical-Ways Corp. v. Page 
(In re Dynamic Techs. Corp.), 106 B.R. 994, 1004 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) (stating that sec-
tion 546(c) is the exclusive remedy for vendors to reclaim goods); In re Rozel Indus., 74 
B.R. at 646; Allstate Fabricators Corp. v. Flagstaff Foodservice Corp. (In re Flagstaff 
Foodservice Corp.), 56 B.R. 899, 908 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Contract Interiors, Inc., 
14 B.R. at 674-75. 
64. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001 (excluding from the designation of an adversary pro-
ceeding any proceeding brought to recover or reclaim property in possession of the trustee 
under section 554(b) or section 725); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 9013, 9014. 
65. Accord In re Rawson Food Serv., Inc., 846 F.2d at 1347; Conoco, Inc. v. Braniff, 
Inc. (In re Braniff, Inc.), 113 B.R. 745, 752 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); see United States v. 
Westside Bank, 732 F.2d 1258, 1263 (5th Cir. 1984) (reclamation is only valid as to goods 
which are identifiable and in the buyer's possession at the time the demand is received). 
66. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Charter Int'l Oil Co., 60 B.R. 854, 856 (M.D. Fla. 
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recognized extension of the right of reclamation to proceeds, and 
these were few, the rule remained that proceeds from the sale of 
goods subject to demand for reclamation, like the goods them-
selves, were not recoverable by the seller if the goods were dis-
posed of before demand was received. 67 Finally, under limited cir-
cumstances, a supplier might be able to reclaim fungible, bulk 
goods that had become commingled in a common pool,68 but not 
where the goods had become transformed into some other prod-
uct.69 
Even when the seller was able to establish all of the elements 
of a proper reclamation claim under state law, U.C.C. section 2-
702(3) explicitly made, as it continues to do so, the seller's ability 
to reclaim the goods subject to the rights of a buyer in the ordi-
nary course and a good faith purchaser. 70 Under the U.C.C., the 
term "purchaser" is defined more broadly than at common law to 
include a secured creditor.71 Therefore, in the case of inventory 
goods, for example, the right to reclaim goods under former sec-
tion 546(c), which expressly incorporated "statutory or common-
law,'m was generally regarded as subordinate to the claim of a 
1986) (proceeds directly traceable from sale of goods in buyer's possession when reclama· 
tion demand was made may be recoverable under section 546(c)). A large number of deci-
sions, however, held that because U.C.C. section 2-702(2) speaks only of reclaiming goods, 
and not of reclaiming proceeds, U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (2013), by extension section 546(c) does 
not create a right to reclaim the proceeds from resale of goods otherwise subject to recla-
mation. See, e.g., Collingwood Grain, Inc. v. Coast Trading Co. (In re Coast Trading Co.), 
744 F.2d 686, 689-92 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that a seller did not demonstrate a right to 
reclaim goods or proceeds, and citing additional authorities supporting this finding). 
67. See Jones Oil Co. v. Intercity Oil Co. (In re Intercity Oil Co.), 122 B.R. 358, 360 
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990); Archer Daniels, 60 B.R. at 856; In re Lawrence Paperboard 
Corp., 52 B.R. 907, 910 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985). 
68. See In re Braniff, 113 B.R. at 754-55 (applying a "first in, first out" theory for allo-
cating fungible, pooled goods among suppliers); see also Garvin, supra note 18, at 257; su-
pra text accompanying note 21. 
69. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. (In re Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp.), 74 B.R. 656, 660-61 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987). 
70. U.C.C. § 2-702(3); see Westside Bank, 732 F.2d at 1260 (stating reclamation can 
never be asserted to defeat the interest of protected third parties who acquire from the 
defaulting buyer); In re Coast Trading Co., 744 F.2d at 690 (stating sale to a good faith 
purchaser cuts off reclamation). The term ''buyer in the ordinary course of business" is de-
fined in U.C.C. section l-201(b)(9) as essentially a retail buyer from a party in the busi-
ness of selling goods of that type. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(9) (2013). The ability of a party with 
voidable title to pass good title to a good faith purchaser is recognized in U.C.C. section 2-
403(1). u.c.c. § 2-403(1) (2013). 
71. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(29), (30) ("purchase" includes taking by lien as well as by 
sale); see also supra text accompanying notes 22-23. 
72. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2000). 
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prior security interest in the debtor's inventory (and proceeds) 
which, under the terms of an after-acquired property clause, at-
tached and took priority as to the goods as soon as the debtor ac-
quired rights in them. 73 
Because of this limitation, and the absence of any guidance in 
former section 546(c), most courts held that the existence of such 
a prior secured creditor operated to negate the reclamation right 
in a bankruptcy case to the extent of the amount of the prior se-
cured lien. 74 These courts reasoned that section 546(c) was in-
tended to preserve, not enhance, the rights of reclaiming sellers, 
such that the seller should be entitled to no greater rights in 
bankruptcy than it would enjoy under state law. 75 According to 
these courts, then, where the claim of the senior creditor under 
U.C.C. section 2-702(3) exceeded the value of the proceeds from 
the resale of the goods, the reclamation right would be worthless. 
Thus, it was only when either the creditor released its lien on the 
goods, or the proceeds from the goods subject to reclamation ex-
ceeded the sum needed to pay the secured creditor in full, that 
the subordinated reclaiming seller's claim would attach-but only 
to the extent of the remaining assets and that was all-. 76 A handful 
of courts went even further and concluded that just the mere ex-
istence of a secured creditor with a lien on the goods (or proceeds) 
subject to reclamation extinguished the reclamation claim entire-
73. See, e.g., In re Diversified Food Serv. Distribs., Inc. 130 B.R. 427, 429 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding holder of previously perfected floating lien on inventory has priori-
ty over reclaiming sellers); Pillsbury Co. v. FCX, Inc. (In re FCX, Inc.), 62 B.R. 315, 323 
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); In re Lawrence Paperboard Corp., 52 B.R. 907, 911 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1985). As noted supra note 31, the secured creditor's bona fide purchaser status can 
also defeat a "cash seller" of inventory. 
74. See, e.g., In re Quality Stores, Inc., 289 B.R. 324, 340 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2003) 
("Because the value of the Debtor's collateral is insufficient to satisfy the secured claim of 
the Prepetition Lenders, there exists no collateral value to support the Reclamation 
Claimants' subordinate rights in the specific inventory consisting of their goods delivered 
to the Debtor."); In re Bridge Info. Sys., Inc., 288 B.R. 133, 138 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2001) 
(finding reclamation creditor produced no evidence to meet its burden of proof that suffi-
cient proceeds remained from sale of inventory to preserve its state law reclamation rights 
against prior perfected secured claim). 
75. Pester Ref. Co. v. Ethyl Corp. (In re Pester Ref. Co.), 964 F.2d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 
1992). 
76. Id. at 848; see also In re Houlihan's Rest., Inc., 286 B.R. 137, 140 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
2002); Mitsubishi Consumer Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Steinberg's, Inc. (In re Steinberg's Inc.), 
226 B.R. 8, 12 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998); In re Leeds Bldg. Prods. Inc., 141 B.R. 265, 269-70 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992) (holding that right to reclaim exists only to the extent that the 
right has value outside of bankruptcy); Toshiba Am. Inc. v. Video King of Illinois, Inc. (In 
re Video King of Illinois, Inc.), 100 B.R. 1008, 1016-17 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989). 
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ly, regardless of whether the secured creditor was ultimately paid 
in full and its lien released as to some or all of the collateral.77 
On the other end of the spectrum, In re Sunstate Dairy & Food 
Products Co. is illustrative of a line of cases that took a very dif-
ferent approach in giving effect in bankruptcy to the restrictions 
contained in U.C.C. section 2-702(3).78 These courts held that the 
operative wording "subject to" did not mean that the reclamation 
right itself was extinguished or scaled back by virtue of the exist-
ence of a superior lien.79 Rather, it was only the ability to exercise 
the right to the extent of the value of the secured claim that was 
cut off and, therefore, the bankruptcy court could not deny the 
reclamation claim unless the alternative relief contemplated by 
former section 546(c)(2) were granted of either an administrative 
expense priority or a substitute lien on other property of the es-
tate.80 These decisions obviously accorded to the reclaiming seller 
a remedy that had no corollary under state law, once more imply-
ing, if not a separate federal remedy, at least a remedy with cer-
77. See In re Shattuc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557, 563-64 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (a sell-
er who is unable to reclaim goods due to the intervening rights of a good faith purchaser 
has no right of reclamation that can be asserted in a bankruptcy proceeding); Lavonia 
Mfg. Co. v. Emery Corp., 52 B.R. 944, 947 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); In re Lawrence Paper-
board Corp., 52 B.R. at 911-12 (deciding existence of secured creditor extinguishes recla-
mation claim). In In re Arico, Inc., even though the secured creditor was oversecured, the 
court declined to invoke the marshaling in order to preserve some assets for the seller's 
reclamation claim after the prior lien had been satisfied. Galey & Lord, Inc. v. Arley Corp. 
(In re Arico, Inc.), 239 B.R. 261, 272-74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
78. Isaly Klondike Co. v. Sunstate Dairy & Food Prods. Co., (In re Sunstate Dairy & 
Food Prods. Co.), 145 B.R. 341 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992). 
79. Id. at 346; see Am. Saw & Mfg. Co. v. Bosler Supply Grp., (In re Bosler Supply 
Grp.), 74 B.R. 250, 254-55 (N.D. Ill. 1987); In re Marko Elecs., Inc., 145 B.R. 25, 29 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992); In re Diversified Food Serv. Distribs., Inc., 130 B.R. 427, 430 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Roberts Hardware Co., 103 B.R. 396, 399 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 
1988); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Wathen's Elevators, Inc. (In re Wathen's Elevators, 
Inc.), 32 B.R. 912, 923 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); see also Lisa S. Gretchko, Seller Beware! Is 
Your Reclamation Claim as Strong as You Think It Is?, A.M. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 1, 2003, 
at *20, available at Westlaw 22-MAR A.M. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (describing this approach as 
consistent with the wording of former section 546(c)(2)). 
80. In re Bosler Supply Grp., 74 B.R. at 254-55; accord In re Diversified Food Serv., 
130 B.R. at 429-30 (explaining reclaiming sellers entitled to administrative expense prior-
ity, not actual sales proceeds, where goods subject to reclamation claim had been sold by 
perfected inventory lien creditor); Pillsbury Co. v. FCX, Inc. (In re FCX, Inc.), 62 B.R. 315, 
322 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); cf In re Lawrence Paperboard Corp., 52 B.R. at 909-10 (ex-
plaining an administrative expense priority in full amount of reclamation claims would 
not be approved as part of negotiated settlement of creditors' reclamation demands where 
record was devoid of any evidence to support such claims). 
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tain unique federal characteristics. 81 This point portends the de-
bacle that would later arise under BAPCP A. 82 
In any case, regardless of how the existence of a prior secured 
claim was conceived in terms of the impact on a reclaiming seller, 
the ability of a bankruptcy court generally under former section 
546(c)(2) to respond to a proper reclamation claim with compen-
satory relief not involving return of the goods was obviously im-
portant in a Chapter 11 case where retention of goods by the 
debtor-in-possession would, in the court's judgment, facilitate the 
prospects for eventual rehabilitation.83 In deciding whether to or-
der physical reclamation of the goods or other compensatory re-
lief, courts opined that the debtor's need for the goods had to be 
balanced against the seller's need for the immediate cash into 
which the goods presumably could be converted if returned. 84 And 
yet, due to uncertainty over market conditions or simply for the 
sake of convenience, in some cases the reclaiming seller might 
have preferred this alternative relief to return of the actual 
goods.85 Ultimately, however, the decision whether to grant a lien 
or an administrative priority in lieu of a right to reclaim resided 
within the sole discretion of the bankruptcy court, but that was a 
state of affairs not long to endure.86 
II. ENTER BAPCP A 
With virtually nothing by way of explanation, section 1227(a) of 
BAPCPA amended section 546(c)(1) of the Code to provide that 
the rights of a trustee under sections 544(a), 545, 547, and 549 
are subject to the rights of a seller of goods to reclaim goods sold 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 55, 63. 
82. See infra text accompanying notes 112, 115, 134-37. 
83. See Pester Ref. Co. v. Ethyl Corp. (In re Pester Ref. Co.), 964 F.2d 842, 847 (8th 
Cir. 1992) (noting that the remedial discretion in section 546(c)(2) facilitates reorganiza· 
tion and provides flexibility in enforcing superior rights of secured creditors). 
84. See, e.g., Eagle Indus. Truck Mfg., Inc. v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (In re Conti-
nental Airlines, Inc.), 125 B.R. 415, 417-18 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991). 
85. The risk, on the other hand, in the case of an administrative expense claim would 
be if, prior to payment, the debtor converted the case to Chapter 7 and the estate turned 
out to be administratively insolvent. See infra note 181. 
86. Whether an administrative claim or a substitute lien is granted is within the dis-
cretion of the court. See, e.g., In re Leeds Bldg. Prods., Inc., 141 B.R. 265, 268-69 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 1992); Conoco, Inc. v. Braniff, Inc. (In re Braniff, Inc.), 113 B.R. 745, 757 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1990). 
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in the ordinary course of business to the debtor if: (1) the debtor, 
while insolvent, received these goods not later than forty-five 
days prior to the commencement of the case, and (2) written de-
mand for reclamation of the goods is made not later than forty-
five days after receipt of such goods by the debtor or, if the forty-
five-day period expires after the commencement of the case, not 
later than twenty days after the commencement of the case.87 Sec-
tion 1227(b) then added an administrative expense priority, codi-
fied as section 503(b)(9), for the value of any goods received by the 
debtor not later than twenty days prior to the commencement of 
the bankruptcy case and which were sold to the debtor in the or-
dinary course of the debtor's business.88 Section 1227(a), contain-
ing the amendments to section 546(c)(l), also eliminated the lan-
guage of former section 546(c)(2) concerning the courts' 
discretionary ability to provide substitutional relief, and replaced 
it with language making clear that entitlement to the new admin-
istrative expense priority in section 503(b)(9) is not precluded by 
the failure of a seller to comply with the notice requirement in re-
vised section 546(c)(1).89 
87. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1227, 119 Stat. 23, 199-200 (2005). A red-lined ver-
sion of the changes follows: 
(c)ill Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section and in section 507(c). and subject 
to the prior rights of a holder of a security interest in such goods or the proceeds thereof, 
the rights and powers of a tht' trustee under sections 544(a), 545, 54 7, and 549 of this title 
are subject to any stattttmy or eonrmon la .. the right of a seller of goods that has sold goods 
to the debtor, in the ordinary course of such seller's business, to reclaim such goods if the 
debtor has received such goods while insolvent, ·within 45 davs before the date of the com-
mencement of a case under this title. but-fB such a seller may not reclaim any such goods 
unless such seller demands in writing reclamation of such goods-
(A) before 10 not later than 45 days after the date of receipt of such goods by the debtor; 
or 
(B) not later than 20 davs after the date of commencement of the case. if sueh 10 day the 
45-day period expires after the commencement of the case", before 20 days after teeeipt of 
stteh goods b, the debtm, and 
(2) If a seller of goods fails to provide notice in the manner described in paragraph !1), the 
seller still mav assert the rights contained in section 503(b)(9). 
(2) the eom t may deny 1 eelamation to a seHet with stteh a 1 ight of 1 eelarnation that has 
made stteh a demand onl:y if the eom t 
(A) g~ants the elaim of sueh a seller primity as a elaim of a kind speei!ied in section 
503(b) of this title, or 
(B) seettres stteh elaim by a lien. 
88. § 1227, 119 Stat. at 200. 
89. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2000), with Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1227, 119 Stat. at 
200. 
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The totality of these changes is as extraordinary as it is per-
plexing, and the further distancing of section 546(c) from state 
law is notable. First, the reference in former section 546(c)(l) to 
any "statutory or common-law" right to the goods sold is gone, 
raising a legitimate question of whether revised section 546(c)(l) 
creates a federal right of reclamation independent from and whol-
ly disassociated from U.C.C. section 2-702(2). 90 Next, the period 
within which written demand must be made after receipt of the 
goods is no longer coincident with state law. Rather, the period 
within which a timely demand may be made, and correspondingly 
the goods potentially subject to reclamation, is extended exponen-
tially from ten to forty-five days after receipt of the goods. 91 Third, 
the fact that demand must be made no later than twenty days af-
ter commencement of the case if the forty-five-day period has not 
yet expired as of the time the bankruptcy case is filed creates the 
curious oddity that, under the right circumstances, there will be a 
shorter demand period when the filing occurs within forty-five 
days of the buyer's receipt of the goods.92 Fourth, the case law un-
der former section 546(c) holding that the reclamation claim is 
subject to a prior security interest that attaches to the goods is 
expressly codified, but the revised version says nothing about the 
priority of a reclamation claim vis-a-vis other claimants protected 
under U.C.C. section 2-702(3), such as a buyer in the ordinary 
course and other bona fide purchasers. 93 Fifth, the reference in 
revised section 546(c) to section 507(c) should probably be to sec-
tion 507(b), dealing with priority inter se among administrative 
90. In In re Tucker, Judge Haines mused: 
[P]erhaps the amended § 546(c) creates its own reclamation right, rather 
than merely validating the right that exists under the U.C.C. This impression 
is supported by the fact that the amendment also strikes the reference to 'any 
statutory or common law' right to reclaim, and instead simply states that the 
trustee's powers are subject to the 'right of a seller' to reclaim. 
Davis v. Par Wholesale Auto, Inc. (In re Tucker), 329 B.R. 291, 398 n.8 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 
2005). 
91. For an alternative explanation for the forty-five-day demand period, see infra text 
accompanying notes 150-52. 
92. This would be true, for example, where the goods were delivered to the debtor on 
March 1, the debtor filed on March 14, but the seller did not learn of the bankruptcy case 
until April 5. Although the forty-five-day period has not expired, it is now more than twen-
ty days since the bankruptcy filing, so a reclamation claim would be untimely. Inexplica-
bly, former section 546(c)(1)(B) gave sellers more time, not less, when bankruptcy was filed 
during the notice period. 
93. See Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1227, 119 Stat. at 199-200; supra note 74 and accompany-
ing text. 
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expense claims under section 507(a)(2). Sixth, the option of the 
court under former section 546(c)(2) to provide an administrative 
claim or substitute lien in lieu of reclamation of the goods is elim-
inated. 
Finally, and perhaps most significant, is the new administra-
tive expense priority in section 503(b)(9) for claims based on the 
value of goods received by the debtor within twenty days of the 
date of filing. 94 This priority exists: (1) without proof of the debt-
or's insolvency; (2) without establishing the seller's right to the 
goods under state law; and (3) without any direct connection to 
the right of reclamation in revised section 546(c), other than the 
clarification in new subsection (c)(2) that the claim is not affected 
by a failure to give notice under subsection (c)(1). In sum, with 
the exception of the issue of whether the reclamation right is su-
perior to a prior secured claim, which was never in much doubt to 
begin with, the 2005 amendments to the credit sellers' remedies 
did nothing to clear up the unsettled questions under the pre-
revised version of the statute and created several new, vexing is-
sues of both interpretation and policy, as catalogued below.95 
A Section 546(c) 
1. Reclamation in the Case Law 
In the first written opinion of significance interpreting revised 
section 546(c), In re Advanced Marketing Services, Inc., the Dela-
ware Bankruptcy Court disappointed open account sellers that 
envisioned BAPCPA as ushering in an era of greatly expanded 
reclamation rights.96 The case entailed a request by Simon & 
Shuster for: (1) a temporary restraining order enjoining the debt-
or from selling approximately $6 million in goods received from 
Simon & Shuster during the forty-five-day period prior to bank-
94. See Michael G. Wilson & Henry P. "Toby" Long III, Section 503(b)(9)'s Impact: A 
Proposal to Make Chapter 11 Viable Again for Retail Debtors, 30 AM. BANKR. lNST. J. 20, 
57 (2011) (''The burden of satisfying those claims often destroys a debtor's ability to con· 
firm a chapter 11 plan that otherwise could permit the company to survive and successful· 
ly reorganize."). 
95. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining that the issue of whether the 
reclamation right is superior to a prior secured claim was not a matter causing great con-
troversy). 
96. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Advanced Mktg. Servs., Inc. (In re Advanced Mktg. 
Servs., Inc.), 360 B.R. 421, 426 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007). 
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ruptcy; and (2) segregation of such goods until the reclamation 
claim was resolved.97 Earlier, Simon & Shuster had served the 
debtor with a written demand for return of the goods. Simon & 
Shuster argued irreparable injury and likelihood of success on the 
merits based, inter alia, on the fact that revised section 546(c) no 
longer allowed the court to substitute a replacement lien or ad-
ministrative claim for a seller's reclamation right, so that Simon 
& Shuster's reclamation claim would be eliminated if the goods 
were permitted to be sold.98 Further, Simon & Shuster main-
tained that there were no prior rights in the goods that took prec-
edence over its reclamation claim since the debtor's pre-filing in-
ventory lender was to be paid off with the proceeds of the debtor's 
postpetition financing. 99 
The court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order, 
concluding that Simon & Shuster's alleged losses could be com-
pensated in the form of money damages, although the court did 
not specifically address how it would be able to offer such substi-
tute relief should it later turn out that the goods were improperly 
liquidated by the debtor. 100 As for the prior lien rights argument, 
however, the court held that because the postpetition debtor-in-
possession financing order provided that the lenders' prepetition 
liens would also secure the postpetition financing, and the terms 
of the postpetition credit were virtually identical to the prepeti-
tion financing, Simon & Shuster's reclamation claim was subor-
dinate to the senior lenders' interest in the goods. 101 While leaving 
many questions unanswered, 102 the effect of the holding in Ad-
97. Id. at 424. 
98. Id. at 426-28. 
99. Id. at 426-27. 
100. Id. at 428. 
101. Id. at 427. The court specifically distinguished the bankruptcy court holding in In 
re Phar-Mor, Inc., 301 B.R. 482, 497-98 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003), on the basis that in 
Phar-Mor, the prior secured lender had already been paid in full from collateral other than 
the collateral that was also subject to the seller's reclamation demand. Advanced Mktg., 
360 B.R. at 427. 
102. For instance, it was suggested that because the issue in Advanced Marketing came 
before the court on motion for a temporary restraining order the court did not, for exam-
ple, consider the seller's possible right to adequate protection or administrative priority for 
goods delivered between the twenty-first and forty-fifth day prior to filing that were sub-
ject to reclamation but became, or might become, unavailable because of disposition by the 
debtor-in-possession. Eric R. Wilson & Robert L. LeHane, Secured Lenders' Pre- and Post-
Petition Liens Trump Reclamation Rights Under Amended §546(c), 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 
26, 27 (2007). The authors note that the court's referral to Simon & Shuster's claim as 
"worthless" is probably some "indication" of how the court would likely have ruled on the 
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vanced Marketing was to disappoint sellers who believed revised 
section 546(c) might: (1) entitle them to what amounted to specif-
ic performance of their claim against goods received within forty-
five days of filing, and (2) alter the pre-BAPCPA rules barring re-
claiming creditors from invoking the doctrine of marshaling of as-
sets against a senior lender with a valid lien on both the goods in 
question and other collateral.103 
Probably the most important post-BAPCPA case to date was 
rendered later the same year-In re Dana Corp.104 Authored by 
longtime and highly respected Bankruptcy Judge Burton Lifland, 
Dana Corp. involved more than 450 reclamation demands on 
goods with an aggregate value in excess of $297 million against 
the Chapter 11 debtors, operating as debtors-in-possession.105 The 
debtors, manufacturers of auto parts, asserted a "prior lien" de-
fense based on a postpetition credit facility secured by all pre-
and postpetition assets of the debtors, and from which the lenders 
under the prepetition credit facility, secured by the prepetition 
assets, were to be paid.106 If upheld, this defense would render the 
reclamation claims valueless since the prepetition debt to be re-
tired with the postpetition credit facility exceeded the value of the 
reclamation claims. Relying on In re Phar-Mor, Inc./07 the sellers 
argued, as did Simon & Shuster in Advanced Marketing, that be-
cause the prepetition debt had been discharged by a source other 
issue. Id. However, even in the case where the goods have value in excess of the lien-
something that was not the case in Advanced Marketing-the elimination by BAPCPA of 
the option of the court to grant a substitute lien or administrative expense priority in lieu 
of reclamation moots the issue in all likelihood. 
103. The Advanced Marketing court noted that Simon & Shuster was essentially call· 
ing on the court to apply the doctrine of marshaling, but that the doctrine cannot be in-
voked by unsecured creditors. 360 B.R. at 427 (citing Yenkin-Majestic Paint Corp. v. 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. (In re Pittsburgh-Canfield Corp.), 309 B.R. 277, 291 
(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2004}}; see also Galey & Lord, Inc. v. Arley Corp. (In re Arclo, Inc.), 239 
B.R. 261, 274-76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (refusing to order marshaling, as too costly and 
time-consuming, to preserve a portion of the reclaiming seller's goods and observing that, 
in any case, marshaling requires two secured creditors). But see In re Suwannee Swifty 
Stores, Inc., No. 96-60807, 2000 WL 33740259, at *3 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 2000) 
(suggesting, in dicta, that marshaling may be invoked by a nonsecured creditor). 
104. 367 B.R. 409 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
105. Id. at 410-11. As in Advanced Marketing, the creditors' claims were based on sales 
extending back forty-five days from the date of the commencement of the case. Id. at 414-
15. 
106. Id. at 410-11. 
107. 301 B.R. 482 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003). 
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than the goods, namely the postpetition financing, the prior lien 
against the goods had been extinguished. 108 Alternatively, the 
sellers argued that BAPCPA created a new federal right of recla-
mation that, presumably, is not subject to authority decided un-
der former section 546(c). 109 
As to the first argument, the court acknowledged a split in the 
pre-BAPCPA case law on the scope of the prior lien defense, but 
found as better-reasoned the authorities holding that if goods 
serving as collateral for prepetition debts are used either to satis-
fy that debt or as collateral for the debtor-in-possession financing, 
the functional effect is the same; namely, that the goods have 
been used to satisfy the prepetition debt. 110 Because, as noted, in 
this case the value of the goods subject to reclamation was less 
than the amount secured by the prior lien, that meant that the 
reclamation claims were effectively extinguished. 111 
The court also rejected the alternative argument that Con-
gress, by eliminating the language in former section 546(c) relat-
ing to any "statutory or common law right," was intending to cre-
ate a new federal bankruptcy law right. 112 In explaining this 
position, Judge Lifland made his case in terms of the structure of 
the Code as originally enacted in 1978, pointing to the continued 
placement of the reclamation right in the Code section titled 
"Limitations on avoiding powers," a section not dedicated to the 
creation of new rights. 113 Beyond that, his rationales supporting 
the conclusion that revised section 546(c) creates no federal rights 
separate from state law were predicated largely on the inadequa-
cies of the revised statute (and thus the difficulties that would be 
associated in parsing the scope of such a new remedy). For exam-
ple, he pointed to the failure of Congress to make a provision for 
108. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 413; see also, Colin T. Darke, Secured Lenders Ver-
sus Reclaiming Vendors: An Analysis of Sixth Circuit's Phar-Mor Decision, 18 NORTON J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 377, 387 (2009). 
109. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 413. 
110. Id. at 418-21 (concluding that the decision of the court in In re Dairy Mart Con-
venience Stores, Inc., 302 B.R. 128 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003), was better-reasoned than Phar-
Mor). 
111. Id. at 419. The total secured prepetition debt was approximately $381 million, 
whereas the largest single reclamation claim was only about $9.6 million. Id. at 413. 
112. Id. at 416 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also supra note 90. 
113. In re Dana Corp., at 416-17. The court also relied on the maxim that amendments 
to the Bankruptcy Code should not be construed to effect major changes without at least 
some discussion in the legislative history. Id. at 417 (citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 
410, 419 (1992)). 
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the protection of buyers in the ordinary course and good faith 
purchasers. 114 Additionally, he noted that revised section 546(c) 
refers to the prior rights of a holder of a security interest in the 
goods but does not indicate what those rights are, and makes no 
provision for the exclusion of goods that are not identifiable or in 
the possession of the debtor on the day of demand. 115 In both in-
stances, Judge Lifland observed that recourse to state law is nec-
essary to clarify these key aspects governing the scope of the right 
of reclamation and, thus, the revised statute should not be read 
as doing more than incorporating the right of reclamation as it 
exists under state law.116 
In a subsequent post-BAPCPA reclamation decision, In re Cir-
cuit City Stores, Inc., the Circuit City debtors, in a jointly-
administered case, sought summary judgment on their omnibus 
objections to the reclamation claims of several suppliers of goods 
to the various Circuit City debtors made in the ordinary course of 
business in the forty-five days preceding the Circuit City Chapter 
11 filing. 117 As in Dana Corp. and Advanced Marketing, the debt-
or-in-possession financing arrangement provided for repayment 
of the senior prepetition lender's indebtedness and a continuation 
of that prepetition lender's security interest in all existing and af-
ter-acquired assets, including inventory and the proceeds there-
from, in favor of the new lender. 118 Several months after filing, the 
debtors concluded that it would not be possible to rehabilitate the 
business, and the court authorized a "going out of business" sale 
of all of the debtors' still-operating stores.119 Thereafter, the debt-
ors proceeded with the filing of a joint plan of liquida tion. 120 
114. Id. at 417 ("Clearly, Congress could not have intended to permit reclamation of 
goods that have been sold to consumers or other good faith purchasers."). 
115. Id. at 416. In short, the court concluded that revised section 546(c) could not be 
construed to grant an independent federal right of reclamation because it simply fails to 
set forth a "coherent comprehensive federal scheme" detailing the contours of such a right. 
I d. 
116. Id. at 417-18. 
117. 441 B.R. 496, 498--99 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010). As to one of the defendants, the de-
cision was affirmed, sub nom., in Paramount Home Entm't, Inc. v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 
445 B.R. 521 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010). 
118. In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 441 B.R. at 499. The DIP Financing Facility provid-
ed that it was to be secured by substantially all of the debtors' existing and after-acquired 
assets and that it was to be used to pay the prepetition secured lenders as well as finance 
postpetition operations. Id. 
119. Id. at 500. 
120. Id. 
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The reclamation claims at issue, which in the aggregate ex-
ceeded $10 million, were made pursuant to a "Reclamation Pro-
cedures Order" entered by the court shortly after the filing. 121 The 
reclamation claimants took no action after their reclamation de-
mands were sent to the debtors under the "Reclamation Proce-
dures Order," other than to file a subsequent claim, on or about 
the time the "going out of business" sale order was entered.122 
These subsequent claims asserted entitlement either to secured 
or priority claim status based on multiple section of the Code, in-
cluding sections 546(c) and 507(a)(2). 123 The debtor filed an omni-
bus objection seeking to have all of the claims classified as gen-
eral unsecured, nonpriority claims. 124 The court, in granting the 
debtors' summary judgment motion, noted the complete absence 
under revised section 546(c) of any authority for granting admin-
istrative expense or secured creditor status on account of recla-
mation claims. 125 Specifically, the court observed that section 546 
is not a remedial statute; rather, "[i]t simply subordinates the 
avoiding powers of a trustee [or debtor-in-possession] ... to the 
right of a seller to reclaim its goods under certain conditions."126 
The court further adopted the Dana Corp. view that revised sec-
tion 546(c) did not create a federal right of reclamation independ-
ent of state law. 127 Turning to state law, the court then pointed 
out that, under U.C.C. section 2-702(2), a seller's right is limited 
to a claim for return of the specified goods, and does not give rise 
to any of the rights associated with a security interest, including 
any claim against the proceeds of the reclamation goods. 128 
121. Id. The "Reclamation Procedures Order" called for claimants to file reclamation 
demands within twenty days following the date of filing, but did not in any fashion alter 
the claimant's substantive rights or their ability to prosecute a claim seeking reclamation. 
!d. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 501. 
124. Id. at 502. 
125. ld. at 504. 
126. ld. at 504 & n.14 (footnote omitted). Additionally, the court stated that it "finds 
the In re Dana Corporation analysis persuasive and concludes that there still exists no 
federal right to reclamation post-BAPCPA." Id. at 505. 
127. Id. at 505 ("In order to prevail, Respondents must be able to prove that they have 
a valid right of reclamation under state law."). 
128. Id. at 51G-11 (distinguishing state law on the ground that section 546(c) grants 
the reclaiming seller the right only to reclaim the goods, and not the goods "or the pro-
ceeds thereof'); see also supra note 66 (explaining whether goods or proceeds may be re-
claimed under section 546(c)). 
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As far as entitlement to administrative expense status, the rec-
lamation claimants urged the court to follow the Sixth Circuit's 
Phar-Mor decision, requiring administrative expense priority 
when goods subject to the reclamation claim had been sold and 
the proceeds used to satisfy the superpriority of the postpetition 
lender's lien. 129 As in Dana Corp., the court declined, noting, ini-
tially, that BAPCPA appeared to moot Phar-Mor and similar pre-
2005 cases by restricting any such claims to the terms of the new 
section 503(b)(9) administrative priority. 130 The court continued, 
however, that even to the extent such authorities remained rele-
vant, the reclamation claimants' failure in this case to take any 
action with respect to their claims, other than initially to assert 
them in the response to the "Reclamation Procedures Order," ne-
gated any further argument for relief. 131 
2. Analysis of the Post-BAPCPA Reclamation Cases 
Until 2005, it was defensible to conceptualize bankruptcy as 
not creating any independent reclamation rights, but simply rec-
ognizing such rights as existed outside of bankruptcy, subject to 
certain additional conditions and limitations, in much the same 
way that section 553(a) enforces setoff rights that arise outside of 
bankruptcy, with certain exceptions. 132 After BAPCPA, it is simp-
ly no longer reasonable to draw that conclusion, even though sev-
eral bankruptcy courts have expressed concern that the practical 
129. In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., at 507; Phar-Mor, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. (In re 
Phar-Mor, Inc.), 534 F.3d 502, 508 (6th Cir. 2008). See generally Darke, supra note 108 
(providing an overview of: (1) bankruptcy financing, (2) reclamation rights, and (3) the 
Phar-Mor decision). 
130. In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 441 B.R. at 507 (concluding that under the current 
version of the statute, administrative expense priority can only be obtained by establish-
ing the criteria that would qualify for an administrative expense under section 503(b)(l) or 
section 503(b )(9)). 
131. Id. at 507-08. The court surmised that the claimants failure to do so was likely a 
product of the fact that they realized it would be pointless in the face of prior blanket liens 
on the debtors' assets, including inventory, the existence of which rendered the reclama-
tion claims valueless. Id. at 509 (citing In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 421 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2007)). 
132. That provision preserves, but does not create, the right to offset mutual prepeti-
tion debts that exists outside of bankruptcy, but excludes certain claims-such as those 
acquired within ninety days of filing for purposes of creating a right to a setoff-and sub-
jects the non bankruptcy right of setoff to the automatic stay and to the provisions of sec-
tion 363 regarding a debtor-in possession's right to use property that may be subject to a 
setoff. See 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012). 
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difficulties associated with that determination would be disrup-
tive to the fair and efficient administration of bankruptcy cases. 133 
Respectfully, the wheels began to come off the tracks with the 
Dana Corp. court's analysis of why revised section 546(c) did not 
create an independent federal right of reclamation. Posing the 
question in that fashion preordained the outcome based simply on 
the orthodoxy that there is no federal commercial law. 134 But 
whether there is or is not a federal commercial law is largely im-
material in that it is simply no longer possible after BAPCPA to 
understand reclamation in bankruptcy as not creating rights oth-
er than (or in addition to) those that exist under state law, if in-
deed it was ever possible to do so. 135 Furthermore, the conclusion 
that BAPCPA did not create a separate federal right of reclama-
tion was not necessary to the principal holding in Dana Corp. 
(and, for that matter, Advanced Marketing) that the postpetition 
credit facility, calling, respectively, for a "roll-up" and a "creeping 
roll-up,"136 trumped the sellers' reclamation claims. 137 
133. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. 
134. Mter the rejection of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), it has been under-
stood that there is no general federal commercial law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to 
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in 
their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.") (emphasis 
added); see also United States v. Stump Home Specialties Mfg., Inc., 905 F.2d 1117, 1119 
(7th Cir. 1990) ("[F]ederal courts have neither the time nor the specialized knowledge to 
forge a new body of commercial law; by doing so they would simply be adding to the al-
ready excessive complexity of American law."). There has, however, developed special fed-
eral common law in a number of areas of activity, such as banking, labor relations, envi-
ronmental protection, pension plans, and of course bankruptcy, where there is a strong 
federal interest. See generally Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of the Columbia Gas 
Transmission Corp. v. Columbia Gas Sys. Inc. (In re Columbia Gas Sys.), 997 F.2d 1039, 
1054-64 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing when federal common law will control the adjudication 
of an issue). Thus, notwithstanding the scruples of federal courts about fashioning a fed-
eral commercial law out of common law cloth, the fact remains that Congress has clearly 
granted the federal courts jurisdiction over many a subject matter otherwise unregulated 
by federal law, but as to which strong federal interests are implicated. In discussing what 
he described as the "interstitial character" of federal legislation in general, Professor Gil-
more cited the former Bankruptcy Act as the "most familiar example" of how state law op-
erates in the background of federal legislation to fill the inevitable gaps in the fabric of 
federal statutory law. GILMORE, supra note 28, at 403; see Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption 
Limitations: A Tale of Two Solutions, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 222 & nn.6-12 (1997) (cit-
ing examples). 
135. See supra text accompanying notes 55, 63, 81. 
136. As explained by the court in In re Capmark Fin. Grp., Inc. 438 B.R. 471, 511 n.15 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2010), a roll-up most simply is the payment of a pre-petition debt with the 
proceeds of a post-petition loan, whereas a "creeping roll-up" is identical to a roll-up except 
that the payment of the pre-petition debt occurs over time. In both instances, the postpeti-
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To underscore the point, the specific reference to "statutory or 
common law" in former section 546(c) made it tenable to concep-
tualize the statute as simply protecting state law reclamation 
claims from avoidance and (as in the past) preserving the state 
law right in bankruptcy, subject to certain restrictions. 138 Under 
the revised version of section 546(c), those rights continue to be 
limited in some ways, but for the first time are also expanded in 
other respects. 139 That is simply a fact-and if it means, advisedly 
or not, that there is now a right to reclaim goods under circum-
stances that would not pertain under state law-well, then that is 
simply what it means. Although the congressional intent was not 
made explicit, what purpose was to be served by deleting the 
phrase "any statutory or common law right of a seller of goods," 
and replacing it with reference to "the right of a seller of goods" 
other than to separate, if not divorce, reclamation claims in bank-
ruptcy from reclamation claims under the U.C.C.?140 
The Dana Corp. opinion pointed out that the title of section 546 
remains "Limitations on avoiding powers" as an indication that it 
is not intended to confer any new rights. 141 This fact, however, is 
largely explicable in historic terms, 142 so it would be a mistake to 
make too much of it. Moreover, the heading of a section cannot 
trump the clear language of the statute, 143 which now no longer 
tion credit is provided by the prepetition lender, so rarely does money actually change 
hands. Rather, as a matter of bookkeeping entries, "[t]he pre-petition loan is deemed satis-
fied and the post-petition loan includes the amount of the pre-petition debt." Id. at 511 n. 
14. 
137. In re Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Advanced Mktg. Servs., Inc. (In re Advanced Mktg. 
Servs., Inc.), 360 B.R. 421, 426-28 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007). Both the pre- and post-amended 
versions of section 546(c)(1) were understood, implicitly and explicitly, respectively, as in-
corporating the U.C.C. section 2-702(3) rule subjecting the reclamation claim to the holder 
of a prior floating lien on lien. Indeed, the court in Dana Corp. predicated its holding 
based on agreement with a pre-BAPCPA case. See In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 419-21 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); supra text accompanying note 74. 
138. Stacey L. Meisel & Lauren Hannon, Decoding the Code: Why the Revisions to Sec-
tion 546(c) Do Not Create a Federal Right of Reclamation for Sellers, 17 NORTON J. BANKR. 
L. & PRAC. 217, 219 (2008) (quoting In re Zeta Consumer Prods. Corp., 291 B.R. 336, 350 
(Bankr. D. N.J. 2003)). 
139. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 414-15 (indicating that, under BAPCPA, the right of 
reclamation has been expanded in two respects: (1) the pre-flling look-back during which 
goods may be subject to reclamation expanded from ten to forty-five days, and (2) the 
grace period within which a seller must file notice of reclamation if not fl.led prior to the 
commencement of the bankruptcy case expanded from ten to twenty days). 
140. See supra note 87. 
141. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 416; see supra text accompanying note 113. 
142. See supra text accompanying note 42-47, 53. 
143. See infra note 213 and accompanying text. 
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coincides with the state law notice period and specifically ad-
dresses to what class of other claimants-holders of prior security 
interests-the reclaiming seller's right are subject. If we indulge 
the pre-BAPCPA conceptualization of reclamation, and assume 
that a seller must comply with both state and federal require-
ments in order to reclaim goods, then Congress' expansion of the 
period within which demand must occur from ten to forty-five 
days was a wholly meaningless and superfluous exercise (except 
possibly in certain rare misrepresentation situations). 144 
By categorical language, the goods potentially subject to recla-
mation under, respectively, U.C.C. section 2-702(2) and revised 
section 546(c)(l) are no longer entirely coextensive. 145 Most perti-
nent to the analysis, there is undeniably now a longer look-back 
period under the Code. Commentators have undertaken to ex-
plain this seeming anomaly, although they start from the premise 
that enhancing the state law rights of reclamation claimants 
would be intolerable. 146 Granted it would not be pretty, but of the 
many recognized theories of statutory interpretation, the "end 
justifies the means" is unknown. 147 Moreover, as a practical mat-
ter, since the effective date of BAPCPA, credit sellers have regu-
larly asserted, and courts have entertained without blushing, rec-
lamation claims for goods received by the debtor within forty-five 
days prior to the commencement of the case. 148 
Nonetheless, the argument proceeds that, to avoid the harmful 
results of an expanded reclamation period, revised section 
546(c)(l) can (and should) ostensively be read as retaining the 
ten-day U.C.C. look-back period. 149 This assertion is made despite 
the fact that the "10," which previously appeared in the statute, 
has been replaced with the "45." The results-oriented explanation 
144. Infra text accompanying notes 151-52. 
145. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2013), with 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1) (2012). 
146. Meisel & Hannon, supra note 138, at 217, 220. 
147. See supra note 9. 
148. For example, in both In re Dana Corp. and In re Advanced Marketing Services, 
discussed supra Part II.A.1, the reclamation demands for goods received by the debtors 
during the forty-five days prior to bankruptcy were denied because of a prior lien, not be-
cause of the absence of a misrepresentation concerning solvency. The Dana court even 
acknowledged the expansion of the notice period for all reclamation claims as one of the 
.changes wrought by BAPCPA. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 414-15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2007); see supra text accompanying note 143. 
149. Meisel & Hannon, supra note 138, at 226. 
2014] RECLAIM THIS 765 
is simply that reference to the ten-day period was superfluous 
given that Congress intended the right to be defined by state 
law-even though under this view it would have been equally su-
perfluous in 1978 to include the reference to "10," and despite the 
fact that BAPCPA also eliminated the prior reference to any right 
arising under "statutory or common law."150 And what about the 
forty-five day period for giving notice? The explanation continues 
that this language was included in order to cure the oversight in 
former section 546(c) of not providing an analog to U.C.C. section 
2-702(2)'s elimination of the ten-day notice requirement in the 
event of written misrepresentation of insolvency within three 
months before delivery of the goods. 151 Thus, the forty-five day 
language, it is suggested, identifies an extended look-back period 
when the debtor has misrepresented solvency to the seller, and it 
is inapplicable in every other situation, where the former ten-day 
rule still pertains. That is, Congress decided to expand reclama-
tion rights in the event of a misrepresentation of solvency, just 
like under U.C.C. section 2-702(2), but only by forty-five rather 
than ninety days. 152 This, it is maintained, is consistent with a 
reclamation statute in bankruptcy that adds requirements to 
state law, but does not enhance rights. 153 
There are a few problems with this creative but uneasy inter-
pretation of statutory text and congressional intent. First, there 
is no reference whatsoever in revised section 546(c)(1) to a sepa-
rate, extended notice period in the event of misrepresentation, a 
distinction that also did not exist under the prior version of the 
statute. Thus, the language of both the former and revised ver-
sions of section 546(c)(1) refer to a signal period of time within 
which demand must be made. The only logical inference from that 
fact is that the written demand requirement is unchanged in 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 225-27. The authors suggest that support for this position can be found in 
the following two articles: Sally S. Neely, How BAPCPA Affects the Rights of Unpaid ?rep-
etition Sellers of Goods, ALI-ABA Advanced Program on Chapter 11 Reorganizations 17-
19 (2008) and the Hon. Bruce A. Markell, Changes to Avoiding Powers Brought About by 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Westlaw SL068 
ALI-ABA 247 (2005). Meisel & Hannon, supra note 138, at 233 n.53. However, a fairer de-
scription would be to say that Ms. Neely and Judge Markell raise this interpretation as a 
possible reading, but do not necessarily endorse it. 
152. Meisel & Hannon, supra note 138, at 226-27. 
153. ld. at 227. 
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purpose and application, other than by the temporal extension of 
thirty-five days. Second, and perhaps most obvious, if the intent 
was to correct an oversight by providing additional rights in the 
event of misrepresentation consistent with state law, why not in-
dicate that intent and then adopt a look-back period coinciding 
with state law, as opposed to abstrusely adopting a notice period 
that is half as long as the state law period and that replaces the 
ten-day demand period that had unquestionably applied in all 
cases under the former version of the statute? Finally, the U.C.C. 
does not deal with situations involving written misrepresentation 
of insolvency by extending the notice period. Rather it waives the 
demand requirement in such a case. 154 If Congress was intent on 
bringing section 546(c) more into line with U.C.C. section 2-
702(2), it is peculiar that Congress would do so using an ap-
proach-extension of the notice period (although not to the full 
three months)-different than the technique used under the state 
law being emulated-elimination of the notice period for goods 
delivered up to three months prior to the misrepresentation. 155 
In short, this proposed construction of section 546(c)(l) defies 
all reason. Lack of legislative history should not be regarded as 
license to invent a legislative intent irrespective of its consonance 
with the plain language of the statute itself. As noted, this is not 
a matter of subscribing to one theory of statutory interpretation 
over another in situations where the meaning of a legislative ex-
pression is unclear, or where underlying circumstances have 
changed in a far-reaching and unanticipated fashion. 156 Rather, it 
is a fact that the only sensible reading of the language of revised 
section 546(c)(l) is that a credit seller that otherwise qualifies 
under the statute, subject to its limitation for prior liens, may re-
claim goods sold in the ordinary course, received by the debtor in 
the forty-five days preceding filing, and still in the debtor's pos-
session.157 The fact that the effect of this interpretation is to ele-
154. u.c.c. § 2-702(2) (2013). 
155. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
156. See Eskridge, supra note 9, at 1554 (analogizing judges to diplomats, who in ap-
plying ambiguous or outdated communiques to unforeseen circumstances, must exercise 
some creativity and discretion, but who, at bottom, are agents in a common enterprise who 
must also obey mandates that are clear); see also Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 253-54 (1992) ("[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it 
means and means in a statute what it says there."). 
157. This is certainly how the statute is being interpreted in practice. See, e.g., In re 
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 441 B.R. 496, 499 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010) (seven claimants all 
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vate the rights of one class of creditors at the expense of other 
more or less similarly positioned creditors does not alter the well-
established principle that "when the statute's language is plain, 
the sole function of the courts-at least where the disposition re-
quired by the text is not absurd-is to enforce it according to its 
terms."158 In this instance, a construction that vests rights in cer-
tain creditors that do not appertain under state law is trouble-
some and messy, 159 but it is not "absurd" nor is it unheard of as a 
matter of bankruptcy law. 160 Likewise, the loss of stability and 
filed demands with respect to goods sold to Circuit City in the ordinary course of business 
during the forty-five day period preceding the filing); see also supra note 148. 
158. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) 
(quoting United States v. Ron Pairs Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). It is rather fundamental that when the express language of a stat-
ute is clear, the court should not adopt a different construction, absent clear legislative 
intent to the contrary. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (quoting Con-
sumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). 
159. For an interesting treatment of why the courts' proclivity for avoiding "messy" 
constructions is misguided, see Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-Messiness Principle in 
Statutory Interpretation, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1465 (2012). The principle articulated by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in Butner v. United States-that a creditor's 
rights, entitlements, and priority in assets of the bankruptcy estate are determined under 
state Jaw-casts a long shadow over federal bankruptcy law. 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979). 
But the shadow is a dappled one, because, as Professor Moringiello has pointed out, it is 
often overlooked that the Court qualified its statement with the perambulatory language 
"[u]nless some federal interest requires a different result." Juliet A Moringiello, (Mis)use 
of State Law in Bankruptcy: The Hanging Paragraph Story, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 963, 987 
(quoting Butner, 440 U.S. at 55); see also Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 
U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (federal common law can exist when necessary to protect a uniquely 
federal interest). Further, the Butner argument ignores the fact that, at most, the decision 
constrains judges from ignoring (or altering) state property law rights even if the judge 
believes that federal bankruptcy policy augurs for a different result. It does not prevent 
Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional authority to enact uniform Jaws on the sub-
ject of bankruptcies, from limiting state law rights and remedies (as section 502(b)(6) does 
with respect to long-term claims of lessors), or expanding on those rights and remedies (as 
revised section 546(c) seems clearly to do). See In re White Plains Dev. Corp., 137 B.R. 139, 
141-42 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992). That Congress should have paid closer attention to the 
rationales offered by the Court in Butner of reducing uncertainty, discouraging forum 
shopping, and preventing a windfall in favor of one party over the other based purely on 
the fortuity of bankruptcy, is fair criticism, but it does not negate the primacy of the Code, 
when demanded, over state law. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat'l 
Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)); see also United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 
676 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding the defendant's suggestion to look to the Uniform Commercial 
Code as a source for the "federal" law of sales persuasive); see also infra note 265. 
160. For example, section 1322(b)(2) of the Code has always afforded favored treatment 
to claims secured by the debtor's residence in order to "encourage the flow of capital into 
the home lending market." Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). Likewise, with the exception of section 507(b)(2), all of the categories 
of priority claims in section 507 reflect policy considerations that Congress deemed to 
trump the all-important equality principle in bankruptcy. See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper 
& Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941) ("The power of the bankruptcy court to subordi-
nate claims or to adjudicate equities arising out of the relationship between the several 
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predictability in commercial transactions that would exist until 
such time as the bankruptcy courts developed a coherent and 
consistent jurisprudence under the admittedly less than fully 
comprehensive and comprehensible scheme in revised section 
546(c) is not grounds to ignore what the statute commands.161 
In Dana Corp., the court stressed that revised section 546(c) 
expressly subordinates the seller's reclamation remedy to the 
rights of a holder of a prior security interest in such goods. 162 As 
noted earlier, that represents a codification of the practice gener-
ally followed under former section 546(c). 163 The court went on to 
observe that the 2005 amendments do not similarly address the 
other two classes of claimants who, under state law, take the 
goods free of the rights of a reclaiming seller, and which it equally 
had been the practice under former section 546(c) to recognize as 
having rights superior to those of a reclaiming sellers. 164 The court 
then mused that "[i]f amended 546(c) created an independent fed-
eral reclamation right that replaced state law, then in bankrupt-
cy a reclaiming seller would conceivably have broad rights supe-
rior to those of buyers in the ordinary course of business, lien 
creditors or good faith purchasers other than a holder of a prior 
security interest."165 Although that may be so, it is not entirely 
clear this must be true. Just because revised section 546(c) cre-
ates new rights, does not necessarily mean that it must be con-
strued as replacing state law. 
creditors is complete."). The requirements under section 365(b)(1)(A) and section 
1124(b)(2) for, respectively, curing a prepetition default in order to assume an executor 
contract or unexpired lease, and avoid impairment of a class of claims, also result in an 
elevation in priority for what would otherwise be general unsecured claims. See Moringiel-
lo, supra note 159, at 988 (urging that federal concerns overcome the presumption that 
state law defines property rights where remedies are concerned); infra note 190. 
161. Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Law-
making in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 81 (2006) ("Bankruptcy is about how 
to divide efficiently and fairly a fund that is too small to satisfy all claimants. Satisfying 
multiple claimants from a limited fund always involves balancing the interests of the 
claimants, as well as the debtor in Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 cases. Such balancing can-
not always be done robotically according to the Code's formulas.") (internal footnotes omit-
ted); see also infra note 265. 
162. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 417 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
163. See supra note 74. 
164. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 416. Under former section 546(c), the limitations on 
the right of reclamation contained in U.C.C. section 2-702(3) were routinely applied. See 
supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
165. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 417. 
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In light of the fact that former section 546(c) was more restric-
tive than U.C.C. section 2-702(2)/66 it was certainly possible that 
a seller might have a valid state law reclamation right that was 
not protected or preserved in bankruptcy. 167 It now may be the 
case that the expanded reclamation rights under revised section 
546(c) complement rather than abrogate or replace state law. 
This could mean that the two classes of claimants identified in 
U.C.C. section 2-702(3), but excluded from revised section 546(c), 
remain protected by virtue of the continued incorporation of the 
U.C.C reclamation rules in bankruptcy. Under this view, revised 
section 546(c) continues to limit state law reclamation rights in 
certain respects as it always has, but now expands them in other 
particulars, such as through the adoption of a demand period that 
extends well beyond the state law time period for making de-
mand. 
Alternatively, and perhaps more realistically, given that the 
practice under former section 546(c) had been to treat reclama-
tion claims as subject to the several classes of purchasers identi-
fied in U.C.C. section 2-702(3), it would not be by any stretch il-
logical to assume that Congress, by expressly recognizing only 
one class of such claimants, did (knowingly or not) elevate the 
rights of reclaiming sellers above those of buyers in the ordinary 
course and other good faith purchasers. 168 Whether it was good 
public policy to do so is another question entirely, as the applica-
tion of this construction would present some disquieting results to 
say the least. 169 This would not, however, be the only case of bor-
166. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57. 
167. See, e.g., Barry v. Shrader Holding Co., Inc. (In re M.P.G., Inc.), 222 B.R. 862, 864-
65 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1998) (holding that a seller's oral demand for return of goods, while 
adequate under state law, did not satisfy section 546(c), and thus deprived the seller of its 
protection). 
168. In fact, that is probably the most plausible construction under a slight variation of 
the interpretive maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius; that is, the presumption 
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely when it includes particular language in 
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same statute. See, e.g., BFP v. 
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994). Here, the disparate inclusion and exclu-
sion are not in different sections of the same act, but in the same section of the Code in its 
pre- and post-amended versions. 
169. Among these results would be the ability of an inventory supplier to a debtor-
hardware store to recover a hammer sold to a consumer in a garden variety retail transac-
tion a couple of weeks prior to filing, although, as a practical matter, that would likely 
never occur. More realistic might be the sale of substantially all of the goods to a bona fide 
purchaser for value. 
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der-line nonsensical results accomplished by BAPCPA. 170 More to 
the point, and as discussed more fully below, 171 softening the im-
pact of the non-sequiturs through stretched and tortured inter-
pretation not only distorts the legislative and judicial roles, it also 
has the unintended effect of serving as a kind of anodyne to the 
worst injuries inflicted by BAPCP A. 172 This bandaging over and 
numbing of the wound, while of some short-term comfort, is inim-
ical in its potential for forestalling administration of the only real 
cure: corrective legislation. 
Generally, we know BAPCPA was motivated by intent to curb 
what was perceived as widespread debtor abuses, particularly in 
consumer cases,
173 
and to corral judicial discretion. 174 It is also be-
yond cavil that certain groups were intended to gain advantage in 
bankruptcy cases, and it seems credit sellers of goods on the eve 
of bankruptcy, along with auto lenders and credit card issuers, 
were among them. 175 In each case, the consequences have implica-
170. In addressing whether the "ride-through" method for dealing with a secured claim 
was still an option after BAPCPA, one court lamented: 
Unfortunately, the BAPCPA amendments do not provide a clear answer. The 
amendments are confusing, overlapping, and sometimes self-contradictory. 
They introduce new and undefmed terms that resemble, but are different 
from, established terms that are well understood. Furthermore, the new pro-
visions address some situations that are unlikely to arise. Deciphering this 
puzzle is like trying to solve a Rubik's Cube that arrived with a manufactur-
er's defect. 
In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 529 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006); see also supra notes 3, 5. 
171. See infra Part III. 
172. In In re Nance, the court acknowledged that "adoption of the strict, mechanical 
approach" for calculating a debtor's "disposable income" as required by amendments to 
Chapter 13 may lead to "impractical results," but observed that such impractical results 
do not render the statute "absurd." 371 B.R. 358, 367 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007). More to the 
point, the court stated that it would "not override the definition and process for calculating 
disposable income as being absurd simply because it leads to results that are not aligned 
with the old law." Id. (quoting In re Alexander, 344 B.R. 742, 747 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). "Unintended, impractical results are for Congress to 
address by amending the statute." Id. 
173. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 2-5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 88-92. 
174. See generally In re Nance, 371 B.R. at 366 (noting that one of the major goals of 
BAPCPA was to replace judicial discretion with specific statutory standards and formu-
lae); Kara J. Bruce, Rehabilitating Bankruptcy Reform, 13 NEV. L.J. 174, 191-93 (2012) 
(analyzing BAPCPA's shift from "standards to rules"); Lauren E. Tribble, Judicial Discre-
tion and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Act, 57 DUKE L.J. 789, 791-92 (2007). 
175. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. It bears reiterating that while the indus-
try capture account of BAPCPA tells an important part of the story, the legislation also 
advanced the interests of a number of other groups, including the holders of domestic sup-
port obligations, retirees, veterans, and, in a few instances, even consumers. See, e.g., 11 
U.S.C. § 527 (2012) (evidencing actual consumer oriented protection through enhanced 
disclosure requirements). See generally Dickerson, supra note 2, at 1902-05 (identifying 
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tions for inter-creditor, as well as debtor-creditor, relationships, 
and inevitably entail a recalibration of the balance that must al-
ways occur among competing policies and interests in a bank-
ruptcy case. The replacement of former section 546(c)(2) with its 
current language is certainly consistent with a desire to restrict 
judicial discretion. Likewise, the expansion of former section 
546(c)(l), as well as the adoption of the new administrative ex-
pense priority in section 503(b)(9), are consonant with the intent 
to advance and favor certain creditor interests. Thus, in many re-
spects, the new treatment of credit seller claims aligns neatly 
with the broad themes that animated BAPCPA from the start. It 
is conceded that these objectives may have been accomplished at 
too high a cost in terms of erosion of other long-standing, funda-
mental bankruptcy policies. They may also have been achieved in 
a clumsy manner and one that will require considerable time to 
sort out through the traditional case-by-case development. But 
that does not mean that the statute cannot mean what it says 
and, for the most part, what it says quite clearly. 176 
Since promulgation of the U.C.C., reclamation has not repre-
sented a terribly powerful or significant remedy for vendors. 177 
The combination of a short window within which to make de-
mand, coupled with subordination to other claimants even when 
the vendor is sufficiently aware and diligent so as to make a time-
ly and proper reclamation demand, operates to make successful 
state law reclamation claims more the exception than the rule. 
Prior to BAPCPA, the same sentiment could be expressed regard-
ing the reclamation remedy in bankruptcy. 178 Indeed, the more-or-
less routine granting (at least until recently) of critical vendor or-
ders represented a much more practical remedy for sellers of 
the interests of several groups, beyond the consumer credit industry, whose interests were 
taken into account in the crafting of the legislation). 
176. This is reinforced by the fact that a bill sponsored by Representative Nadler to 
repeal section 503(b)(9) and restore section 546(c) to its pre-BAPCPA form died in commit-
tee. Business Reorganization and Job Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 1942, 111th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2009). 
177. See, e.g., Chemical-Ways Corp. v. Page (In re Dynamic Techs. Corp.), 106 B.R. 994, 
1004 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) ("Section 546(c) is the exclusive remedy available to vendors 
who are attempting to reclaim their goods."). 
178. Crown Quilt Corp. v. HRT Indus., Inc. (In re HRT Indus., Inc.), 29 B.R. 861, 862 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (commenting that seldom is property actually reclaimed in a reor-
ganization case in lieu of other available relief); cf supra notes 78-81 and accompanying 
text (regarding the pre-BAPCPA alternative relief provided in some cases to reclaiming 
sellers who were unable to reach the goods subject to the claim). 
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goods than reclamation, unburdened as it was (and still is) by the 
intricacies of section 546(c) in both its current and original 
form. 179 In any event, with BAPCPA, Congress seems to have 
swung the pendulum in the other direction by adopting a nearly 
unqualified administrative expense priority for sellers whose 
claims arise within twenty days of filing, 180 and amending section 
546(c) to permit, subject to certain conditions and limitations, 
what appears to be a right to reclaim goods received by the debtor 
between twenty-one and forty-five days prior to the commence-
ment of the case. 181 This may represent bad policy judgment in 
terms of larger system goals, but that does not mean that the leg-
islative commands represent an indecipherable enigma that con-
sequentially frees us to search for alternative meaning wherever 
it can be most conveniently and expediently found. Rather, the 
179. In In re KMart Corp., Judge Easterbrook decided that bankruptcy courts' more-or-
less routine granting of critical vendor orders under the doctrine of "necessity" was not 
justified under their section 105 or section 364 powers. 359 F.3d 866, 871-72 (7th Cir. 
2004). The court left open the possibility of granting a request to pay prepetition debt of 
critical vendors under section 363(b)(1), but only when the debtor is able to "prove, and not 
just allege, two things: that, but for immediate full payment, vendors would cease dealing; 
and that the business will gain enough from continued transactions with the favored ven-
dors to provide some residual benefit to the remaining, disfavored creditors, or at least 
leave them no worse off." Id. at 868, 872-73; see also Alan N. Resnick, The Future of the 
Doctrine of Necessity and Critical-Vendor Payments in Chapter 11 Cases, 47 B.C. L. REV. 
183, 203 (2005). 
180. It has actually been suggested that section 503(b)(9) was intended by Congress to 
be a response to the ad hoc nature of critical vendor orders, and perhaps as well to the 
Seventh Circuit's decision in KMart, but the argument is far-fetched. See Mark A. 
McDermott, Critical Vendor and Related Orders: Kmart and the Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 409, 426-27 
(2006) (arguing for continuation of critical vendor payments even after BAPCPA); Brendan 
M. Gage, Note, Should Congress Repeal Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9)?, 19 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 215, 229-32 (2011) (observing that if Congress' goal was to eliminate 
the need for critical vendor orders with section 503(b)(9), it failed to achieve that goal). On 
the other hand, it was predicted, and has apparently been the case, that the 2005 changes 
to the Code have, along with other factors, dramatically reduced the need for critical ven-
dor orders. See Douglas G. Baird, Essay: Bankruptcy from Olympus, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
959, 965 & n.25 (2010) (stating priority afforded by section 503(b)(9) "is usually enough to 
keep [vendors] sufficiently happy that a critical-vendor order is not necessary"); Lauren C. 
Cohen, The Application of Section 502(d) to Section 503(b)(9) Claims-"You Can Put Lip-
stick on a Pig," 18 NORTON J. BANKR. L & PRAC. 259, 262 (2009) ("One of the effects of the 
implementation of section 503(b)(9) has seemingly been a decrease in 'critical vendor' first-
day motions, which have apparently been replaced with '503(b)(9) motions."'); see also In re 
News Publ'g Co., 488 B.R. 241, 244-46 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013) (denying the debtor's mo-
tion for authorization to pay prepetition claims of alleged "critical vendors" on the basis of 
failure to satisfy KMart's "stringent" test). 
181. Of course, the right to reclaim extends to goods that might also make up a section 
503(b)(9) administrative claim, but it is the rare case where that altemative would be at-
tractive to a vendor given the relative simplicity of a claim under section 503(b)(9). 
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revised treatment for twenty- and forty-five-day credit seller 
claims is easily explicable as a by-product of the legislative pro-
cess, which, on each occasion when it occurs, involves moving the 
normative fulcrum in one direction or the other in the ultimate 
accommodation of various constituents with a cognizable interest 
in the process. Sometimes we applaud the change and in other in-
stances not, but we cannot responsibly ignore it.182 
B. Section 503(b)(9) 
1. The Twenty-Day Claims in the Case Law 
BAPCPA's incorporation into the Code of an administrative ex-
pense priority for twenty-day claims is a game changer for credit 
sellers eligible to assert rights thereunder. It effectively elevates 
what previously would have been a run-of-the-mill general unse-
cured claim into a priority payment that must be paid in full un-
less the estate is administratively insolvent. 183 This invests sec-
tion 503(b)(9) claimants, individually and as a class, with 
enormous leverage over the viability of reorganization. 184 More-
182. In In re Miller, the court held that, "[a]lthough we have no reason to pass judg-
ment on the process by which BAPCPA became law, we note that perceived poor drafting 
should not be regarded as a license to invalidate plain-text readings in the name of fixing 
a statute that some believe is broken." DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. v. Miller (In re Miller), 
570 F.3d. 633, 639 (5th Cir. 2009). The court in Miller also rejected the "[e]quity of the 
statute" theory as "essentially [being] a 'dead letter' from the beginning of the twentieth 
century." Id. The "equity of the statute" approach, grounded in ancient common law doc-
trine, reflects a challenge to the new textualism in statutory interpretation and reflects a 
strong purposivist view. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22-27 (2001}; supra note 9. 
183. See In re Plastech Engineered Prods., Inc., 394 B.R. 147, 151 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
2008) (noting that, unless otherwise agreed, the holder of an allowed administrative ex-
pense claim must receive cash equal to the amount of the claim as of the plan effective 
date); see also In re Bashas' Inc., 437 B.R. 874, 895 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2010} (approving pay-
ment of roughly $30 million of section 503(b)(9) claims on the plan effective date). It is also 
quite possible under section 503(b)(9) that, on motion of the creditor, payment might occur 
at any point in time prior to the effective date of the plan. See In re Bookbinders' Rest., 
Inc., No. 06-12302ELF, 2006 WL 3858020, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2006) (holding 
that the timing on payment of an administrative expense allowed under section 503(b)(9) 
resides within the discretion of the court). 
184. Particularly in situations where the debtor is a large retailer, section 503(b)(9) 
provides credit sellers with enormous leverage in Chapter 11 cases. Gage, supra note 180, 
at 217-18 (stating that, for restaurants and retailers with high inventory turnover, twen-
ty-day claims have presented an "insurmountable hurdle to a successful non-liquidation 
reorganization"); see also Bruce, supra note 174, at 199 (noting that the prospects of an 
immediate cash recovery through "quick liquidation may overshadow the creditor's inter-
est in supporting the reorganization" of the debtor). For an example of a case where sec-
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over, because administrative expenses have always been under-
stood as relating to postpetition expenditures critical to the 
preservation of the estate, the new priority for prepetition debts 
arising out of the ordinary course of sale, and delivery to the 
debtor, of goods on the eve of bankruptcy has also required bank-
ruptcy professionals to change the way in which they tend to 
think about what constitutes an administrative expense. 185 
Once more, the absence of any legislative guidance has led (and 
permitted) courts and commentators to speculate on the purpose 
for this special priority. 186 It also left courts that desire to make 
sense out of the most disturbing consequences of the new provi-
sions without much to work with in: seeking feasible answers to a 
number of questions concerning the scope and availability of the 
priority, as well as the relationship between section 503(b)(9) and 
section 546(c). 187 The leading treatise in the field pronounces that 
the rationale for affording administrative priority to twenty-day 
claimants was intended to prevent a debtor, knowing it would not 
be able to pay for them, from loading up on goods that the debtor 
anticipates will be useful in the imminent bankruptcy case. 188 
Others are less sure of this explanation, and a variety of alterna-
tive theories have been offered, 189 most prominent and compelling 
among them being the hope that, in some cases, bankruptcy 
tion 503(b)(9) claims contributed to the conclusion that reorganization was not feasible, 
see In re Souza, No. 12-13341, 2012 WL 8441318, at *6 & n.l, *9 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 
26, 2012). 
185. Section 503(b) accords a second priority under section 507(a)(2) for claims entitled 
to administrative expense priority under section 503(b). 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (2012). Sec· 
tion 503(b)(l)(A) refers to the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate. 
Id. § 503(b) (2012). The non-exhaustive list of administrative expense claims in the re· 
mainder of the subsections of 503(b) all pertain to obligations arising either in connection 
with the filing of a petition or postpetition, except for section 503(b)(9). Id. 
186. See Gage, supra note 180, at 229 (identifying as the four most popular theories: 
"(1) the critical vendor order replacement theory; (2) the continued dealings theory; (3) the 
stockpiling theory; and (4) the reclamation fortification theory."). 
187. See id. at 228, 234-36 (noting that "[t]he legislative history on section 503(b)(9) is 
virtually nonexistent" and discussing the scope and practical realities of section 546(c) in 
conjunction with section 503(b)(9)). 
188. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY~ 503.16[2], p.503-79 (15th ed., rev. 2009). It is, 
however, curious if this was truly the rationale for section 503(b)(9), why the focus is on 
goods delivered in the ordinary course of the debtor's business, as opposed to the ordinary 
course of the seller's business. By definition, a last minute stockpiling of goods prior to fil· 
ing is not in the ordinary course of the debtor's business. This is part of the reason why the 
continued dealings explanation of section 503(b)(9) seems the more compelling one. See 
infra note 269 and accompanying text. 
189. See supra note 186. 
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might be avoided entirely by encouraging vendors to continue to 
do business with the financially beleaguered debtor. 190 This lack of 
clarity and agreement over underlying purposive design for 
BAPCPA's revisions relating to credit seller claims has only made 
things that much more challenging for courts searching for prin-
cipled ways to mitigate what they regard as the most damaging 
results emanating from application of the statutory text. 
Among the elucidative questions that have emerged in relation 
to section 503(b )(9), 191 the most germane for present purposes are 
those that deal with the interaction vel non between the new ad-
ministrative expense claim and section 546(c) reclamation 
claims. 192 Some courts have perceived the two provisions as oper-
ating in tandem, which is pragmatically sensible, but without any 
textual support in, and arguably even contrary to, the legislation 
itself. 193 For example, in In re Momenta, Inc., the seller-creditor 
filed a motion seeking allowance of a $163,527.95 administrative 
expense claim for shipments of goods made within twenty days of 
the petition under six different invoices. 194 The debtor did not dis-
190. This policy is reflected in other areas of the Code as well, including several of the 
preference exceptions in section 547(c), the section 502(f) priority for gap claims in invol-
untary cases, and the administrative expense priorities in section 503(b)(1)(A). 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 502, 503, 547 (2012). In each case, bankruptcy equality policy is sacrificed to a certain 
extent in order to advance this goal. Id.; see also supra note 160. With the decline in effec-
tiveness of the reclamation remedy to recover inventory shipped just prior to bankruptcy, 
the section 503(b)(9) priority has served as a counterweight against the imposition of re-
strictive credit terms (or the withdrawal altogether of credit) for distressed debtors. See, 
e.g., AMERICAN BANKR. INST. COMM'N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPrER 11 (May 21, 
2013) (testimony of Paul Calahan), available at http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/ 
files/statements/21may2013/Pau1Calahan_Testimony.pdf. 
191. Several of these issues were identified by Judge Lifland in In re Dana Corp., 367 
B.R. 409,411-12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). An even more comprehensive catalogue of issues 
arising under section 503(b)(9) can be found in Paul R. Rage & Patrick R. Mohan, Recent 
Developments in Section 503-Administrative Expenses, 2012 NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR. 
L. 785, 823 (2012), where the authors state that "[i]n the seven years since section 
503(b)(9) became effective ... courts continue to deal with litigation with respect to nearly 
every part of the statutory language." 
192. As discussed in much greater detail infra text accompanying notes 239--51, the 
issue is whether the limitations that pertain to section 546(c) apply in connection with sec-
tion 503(b)(9). See also In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 415 ("There is no shortage of com-
mentary on the interplay of sections 503(b)(9) and 546(c)."). 
193. One commentator has urged that not only should the terms in the two sections be 
interpreted with the identical meaning, but that the defenses available in section 546(c), 
such as the prior lien defense, should also apply to section 503(b)(9) claims. Frederick J. 
Glasgow III, Comment, Reclaiming the Defenses to Reclamation, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 
301, 303 (2010). The effect of doing so would be, for all practical purposes, to negate sec-
tion 503(b)(9) from having any impact except in a very narrow sliver of cases. See infra 
note 197. 
194. 455 B.R. 353, 355-56 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2011). 
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pute that all of the shipments were made during this period and 
conceded that the shipments under two of the invoices, for goods 
received by the debtor in the twenty days preceding filing, were 
entitled to administrative priority. 195 The debtor contested, how-
ever, the seller's entitlement to priority with respect to the other 
four shipments-so-called "Drop Shipments"-made directly to 
the debtor's customers, on the grounds that these goods were not 
"received by the debtor" within the meaning of section 503(b)(9).196 
The court began its analysis by citing the axioms that the 
words in any one statutory provision must be understood in rela-
tion to their context within the overall statutory scheme, and that 
when Congress amends the bankruptcy laws it is assumed not to 
effect major change without signaling such in the legislative his-
tory.197 The court then observed that section 503(b)(9) was intro-
duced into the Code under a subsection of the same section of 
BAPCPA that amended section 546, and noted the pre-BAPCPA 
use of administrative priority to a reclamation claimant as anal-
ternative to recovery of the goods under former section 
546(c)(2).198 Based on this, the court concluded that sections 
503(b)(9) and 546(c) "are related provisions that should be read 
together."199 Proceeding from the proposition that section 546(c) 
creates no independent federal rights, but simply allows a credit 
seller to exercise her state law remedies subject to the additional 
limitations imposed by the Code on the exercise of those reme-
dies,200 the court turned to the U.C.C.'s understanding of the term 
"received" to conclude that the supplier could only assert an ad-
ministrative claim for those goods as to which the debtor had 
physical possession or could be deemed in constructive possession 
within the meaning ofU.C.C. section 2-705(2).201 Inasmuch as the 
195. Id. at 356. 
196. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
197. Id. at 357. On this basis, the court accorded section 503(b)(9) a very narrow field of 
operation, as essentially providing an alternative remedy for a seller entitled to reclama· 
tion but for its failure to comply with the notice requirements of section 546{c)(1). ld. 
198. Id. at 357-58. 
199. Id.; accord In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 432 B.R. 225, 229 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
2010); S. Polymer, Inc. v. TI Acquisition, LLC (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 410 B.R. 742, 
745 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2009). 
200. In re Momenta, Inc., 455 B.R. at 358 (citing In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 416 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)). 
201. Id. at 359-60. U.C.C. section 2-705(2) terminates a seller's right to stop goods in 
transit upon the happening of any one of four events. The first entails the buyer taking 
possession of the goods. The remainirlg three involve possession through third parties that 
are constructively deemed to be tantamount to possession by the buyer. See In re Wezbra 
Dairy, LLC, 493 B.R. 768, 770-71 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2013) (holding that property was 
2014] RECLAIM THIS 777 
facts did not support constructive possession of any of the goods 
subject to the drop shipments, the seller's administrative expense 
was limited to the goods physically delivered directly to the debt-
or. 202 
In contrast with Momenta, Inc. and similar authorities that 
seem to read section 503(b)(9) as narrowly offering an alternative 
remedy for reclaiming sellers, 203 the bankruptcy court in In re 
Erving Industries, Inc. took a very different view of the relation-
ship between sections 503(b)(9) and 546(c).204 In the main, the 
case involved the appropriateness of a claim under section 
503(b)(9) for the value of electricity supplied to the debtor during 
the twenty days preceding filing. 205 Consistent with the generally 
accepted approach to the question, 206 the court in Erving applied 
the Article 2 definition of goods for purposes of interpreting the 
scope of section 503(b)(9).207 However, unlike the conclusion 
reached in some earlier cases,208 the court determined under that 
deemed received upon acquisition of possession, irrespective of the location of title). 
202. In re Momenta, Inc., 455 B.R. at 361. The court in Momenta, Inc. went on to con-
clude, in accord with most other decisions addressing the issue, that section 502(d) was 
inapplicable to allowed administrative expense claims generally and to a supplier's admin-
istrative expense claim in particular. Id. at 364; accord ASM Capital, LP v. Ames Dep't 
Stores, Inc. (In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc.), 582 F.3d 422, 427 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Halabu, 
No. 11-59449, 2013 WL 780757, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 1, 2013); In re Energy Con-
version Devices, Inc., 486 B.R. 872, 874, 878 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); see also Michael 
Ryan Diaz, Note, Disallowing Administrative Expenses Under Section 502(d): When 
Claims Are Not "Claims" Under the Bankruptcy Code, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 397, 
413 (2012) (agreeing with the majority of courts that administrative expenses are not sub-
ject to section 502(d)'s disallowance provision). But see In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 426 
B.R. 560, 571 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010) (holding that the goals of equitable distribution and 
efficiency support the conclusion that section 502(d) may be used to temporarily disallow 
section 503(b)(9) claims pending resolution of preference litigation); Cohen, supra note 
180, at 267-68, 271 (arguing on policy grounds that section 502(d) should apply to all ad-
ministrative expenses, but, at a minimum, to section 503(b)(9) claims). 
203. See 455 B.R. at 357-58; see also In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 416 B.R. 531, 536--
37 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009) (concluding that section 503(b)(9) was adopted by Congress as 
an attempt to enhance certain types of reclamation claims); Glasgow, supra note 193, at 
304, 315, 339 (urging that section 503(b)(9) be read in light of section 546(c)). 
204. 432 B.R. 354, 373 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010). 
205. Id. at 356. 
206. See, e.g., In re Grede Foundries, Inc., 435 B.R. 593, 594-95 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 
2010) (noting that, almost without exception, courts have looked to the U.C.C.'s definition 
of "goods"); GFI Wis., Inc. v. Reedsburg Util. Comm'n, 440 B.R. 791, 797-98 (Bankr. W.D. 
Wis. 2010) (holding that it is reasonable to apply the definition of goods provided by the 
U.C.C. because courts often apply U.C.C. definitions when interpreting Bankruptcy Code 
provisions). 
207. In re Erving, 432 B.R. at 365-66. 
208. In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 421 B.R. 231, 239 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009); In re Sa-
maritan Alliance, LLC, No. 07-50735, 2008 WL 2520107, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. June 20, 
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definition that the sale of electricity did constitute the sale of 
goods for purposes of section 503(b)(9).209 
Of greater moment for current purposes, however, is the court's 
discussion of an alternative argument raised by the debtor; spe-
cifically, "that the meaning of goods under § 503(b)(9) should be 
interpreted in relation to the reclamation provisions under § 
546(c) and properly includes only goods that are capable of being 
'stockpiled' by debtors and reclaimed by creditors."210 This argu-
ment, the court mused, "goes too far and disregards the plain lan-
guage of§ 503(b)(9)."211 The court refused, in other words, to read 
the language of section 546(c)(2) as limiting in any way the right 
to assert priority under section 503(b)(9) to those creditors who 
might have qualified as reclamation sellers but for the failure to 
make timely demand.212 Finally, the court dismissed the argu-
ment that placement of the reclamation amendments and the 
2008) (stating that electricity is more properly characterized as a service). A number of 
subsequent decisions have also adopted that view. E.g., In re NE Opco, Inc., _ B.R. _, 
No. 13-11483, 2013 WL 5880660, at *12 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 1, 2013) (holding that be· 
cause electricity is consumed almost at the same moment that it is identified to the con· 
tract, it is not moveable and, thus, cannot qualify as a "good"); In re PMC Mktg. Corp., _ 
B.R. _,No. 09-02048, 2013 WL 4735736, at *6 (Bankr. D.P.R. Oct. 1, 2013). 
209. In re Erving, 432 B.R. at 368; accord In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202 
(ALG), 2012 WL 3879995 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2012); cf In re Great Atl. & Pac. Tea 
Co., 498 B.R. 19, 28--29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (remanding bankruptcy court's determina· 
tion that electricity is not a good for an evidentiary hearing as to whether electricity is me-
tered and consumed at the same time or, as logic dictates, there is a delay between identi-
fication and consumption); In re Plastech Engineered Prods., Inc., 397 B.R. 828, 839 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008) (distinguishing natural gas from electricity). 
210. In re Erving, 432 B.R. at 372 (footnote omitted). 
211. Id. at 372-73. 
212. Id. at 373; see also GFI Wis., Inc. v. Reedsburg Util. Comm'n, 440 B.R. 791, 802 
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2010), wherein the court stated: 
Finally, the bankruptcy court was correct to reject appellant's argument that 
although the definition of "goods" is governed by the UCC, the term should be 
limited to goods that are reclaimable. Congress added § 503(b)(9) to the 
Bankruptcy Code as part of § 1227 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act, entitled ''Reclamation." Most of§ 1227 is devoted to 
amending § 546 of the Code to provide relief to sellers of goods who failed to 
give an effective notice for reclamation. Appellant reads this as an indication 
that § 503(b)(9) is a reclamation concept and suggests that goods must be re-
claimable in order for a seller to have a § 503(b)(9) claim. Appellant contends 
that once electricity has been metered, it is consumed by the customer and is 
no longer capable of being reclaimed. 
The bankruptcy court rejected this argument, noting that § 546 does not 
require that goods must be reclaimable to fall under § 503(b)(9) and at any 
rate, electricity might well be reclaimable, as when it is stored in a bat-
tery .... I agree. Nothing in the language of§ 503(b)(9) requires a claimant to 
be entitled to a reclamation right under § 546. 
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new priority in the same section of BAPCPA created any neces-
sary linkage between the two provisions, commenting that "the 
sheer placement of sections of the public law cannot trump the 
plain language of the Bankn:ptcy Code."213 
In In re Brown & Cole Stores, LLC, the Ninth Circuit Bank-
ruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's holdings 
that the section 503(b)(9) priority (in this case for in excess of $6 
million for the twenty-day sales) extends to secured as well as 
unsecured claims, and reversed the bankruptcy court's determi-
nation that the right of setoff did not apply to such claims.214 As to 
the former point, the debtor argued that the amendment of sec-
tion 503(b)(l)(B)(i) in 2005 to clarify that the priority for any tax 
incurred by the estate pertained whether the claim was "secured 
or unsecured" implied that the absence of comparable language in 
section 503(b)(9) should be understood as indicating Congress' in-
tent to limit the new administrative expense priority to unsecured 
twenty-day claims.215 The majority opinion rejected the argument, 
noting that section 503(b)(9) is unambiguous on its face and there 
was no reason for the court to inquire ''beyond its plain lan-
guage."216 Insofar as the right of setoff was concerned, the court 
disagreed with the bankruptcy court that the element of mutuali-
ty was lacking simply because the claim against the estate was 
an administrative expense claim.217 To the contrary, the court 
noted that what is critical in determining the applicability of sec-
tion 553(a) is not whether the claim against which setoff is sought 
is an administrative expense, but rather whether the claim is a 
pre or postpetition claim.218 Because section 503(b)(9), unlike oth-
er administrative expenses, applies to prepetition obligations, 
setoff should generally be permitted.219 Moreover, the majority 
213. In re Erving, 432 B.R. at 373 (adopting the reasoning of In re Plastech, 397 B.R. at 
838, that there is no basis to import a requirement that goods be reclaimable into entitle-
ment to priority under section 503(b)(9)). 
214. Brown & Cole Stores, LLC v. Assoc. Grocers, Inc. (In re Brown & Cole Stores, 
LLC), 375 B.R. 873, 875, 881 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007). 
215. Id. at 877-78. 
216. Id. at 878. 
217. Id. at 878-79. 
218. Id. at 879. 
219. I d. (noting that the provisions of section 553(a), which do not apply to most admin-
istrative expense claims, do apply to twenty-day sales claims). 
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opinion concluded that the debtor was not estopped, as the bank-
ruptcy court had held, from asserting the right of setoff "as a mat-
ter of equity."220 
2. Analysis of the Section 503(b)(9) Case Law 
Efforts to restrict the scope of section 503(b)(9) to a supple-
mental remedy available to the limited class of sellers who would 
have been entitled to reclamation but for a minor noncompliance 
with the notice requirement of section 546(c)(l) are as flawed as 
the efforts to continue to define reclamation after BAPCPA by 
reference to state law alone. Although the parade of evils both ef-
forts would avoid, if successful, is clear and present, in the long 
run the harm resulting from the contrived and unnatural inter-
pretation of statutory language in order to accomplish those aims 
is far more damaging to system values and integrity. 221 
With some exceptions, Erving and the majority opinion in 
Brown & Cole Stores being among them, the courts largely have 
done a creditable job since BAPCP A in preventing the adoption of 
the new priority in section 503(b)(9) from undermining or unduly 
interfering with core bankruptcy equality policies. 222 There is, 
however, a rub, and that is that the statute does not say, express-
ly or impliedly, what several of these reported decisions want it to 
say (and which it perhaps even should say, but doesn't). 223 The 
urge to see in section 503(b)(9) a critical linkage with the right of 
reclamation is understandable in light of the counterproductive 
results associated with the elevation of potentially enormous 
220. ld. at 879-80. The basis for the holding below was the debtor's failure to advise 
the vendor that it was contemplating bankruptcy. The majority opinion of the Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel, however, correctly noted that there is no "duty to warn" creditors about 
the possibility of an impending bankruptcy. Id. 
221. If there is no deference to even a weak conception of legislative supremacy, and a 
court is not restricted by statutory language, then a court can essentially make whatever 
rule it wishes. This flouts the core principles of separation of powers and respect for the 
rule oflaw. See Farber, supra note 9, at 284-88; see also supra notes 156, 158 and accom-
panying text. 
222. This has been accomplished principally by artificially linking section 503(b)(9) to 
the right of reclamation under section 546(c). See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying 
text. 
223. See In re Shat, 424 B.R. 854, 864 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) ("[T]he starting point [in 
statutory interpretation] is the presumption that Congress intended the accepted and 
plain meaning of the words it used."). 
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prepetition unsecured claims to administrative priority status, 
but it is misguided.224 
Consider Judge Jaroslovsky's separate opmwn in Brown & 
Cole Stores. 225 He has no problem with the majority's setoff analy-
sis,226 but argues for limitation of the section 503(b)(9) priority to 
unsecured claims, noting a lack of clarity within the section itself 
and a presumption that Congress acts intentionally when it in-
cludes specific language in one section of a statute but does not do 
so in another.227 More fundamentally, however, the opinion focus-
es on the policy consequences implicated by the majority's deci-
sion; namely, the chilling impact on the prospects for reorganiza-
tion if a secured claim can also be granted priority status.228 To 
avoid such a blow to reorganization prospects, Judge Jaroslovsky 
urges that section 503(b)(9) be woven "into the tapestry of Ameri-
can bankruptcy law, preserving the clear intent of Congress to 
protect recent suppliers of goods to debtors without unraveling 
other provisions of the Code meant to facilitate reorganization."229 
Unfortunately, while section 503(b)(9) may be a missed stitch 
in the larger fabric of American bankruptcy law, Congress' intent 
was anything but clear, and, on its face, section 503(b)(9) is not 
limited to unsecured claims.230 In discussing policy considerations 
224. See infra note 228 and text accompanying note 229. 
225. In re Brown & Cole Stores, LLC, 375 B.R. at 881 (Jaroslovsky, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 881-82. Following the failure of the Circuit City Chapter 11, the House Ju-
diciary Committee conducted a hearing to determine why Chapter 11 could not save Cir-
cuit City. Several of the witnesses who testified at that hearing, including Professor Jack 
Williams (appearing on behalf of the American Bankruptcy Institute) and Richard M. Pa-
chulski (Counsel to the Circuit City Creditors' Committee) identified section 503(b)(9) as a 
primary culprit in the failure of Circuit City and other large retailer Chapter 11 cases. 
Circuit City Unplugged: Why Did Chapter 11 Fail to Save 34,000 Jobs?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, lllth Con g. 
25-26, 92-93 (2009) (statements of Richard M. Pachulski & Jack F. Williams). 
229. In re Brown & Cole Stores, LLC, 375 B.R. at 882 (Jaroslovsky, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added); see also Glasgow, supra note 193, at 326 
(agreeing with the dissent in Brown & Cole Stores that a creditor should only receive an 
administrative claim to the extent that its secured claim is not fully secured). 
230. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. Judge Jaroslovsky cites the canon that 
Congress is presumed to act intentionally when it includes language in one section-in 
this instance section 503(b)(1)(B)(i}-but not another section, in this case section 503(b)(9). 
In re Brown & Cole Stores, LLC, 375 B.R. at 881 (Jaroslovsky, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). By the same token, however, one must assume that Congress acts in-
tentionally when it amends the language of a single provision-in this case section 
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and his concern for reorganization, Judge Jaroslovsky acknowl-
edged that allowing priority to a secured creditor may not have a 
big impact in Chapter 7.231 This is almost certainly true. Not to be 
lost sight of, however, is the fact that, as applied to unsecured 
creditors, the impact of section 503(b)(9) in a liquidation context 
can be just as disruptive as it is in Chapter 11, since its effect is 
to elevate one type of unsecured claim over all others in direct 
contravention of one of the primary goals and central policies of 
the Bankruptcy Code; namely, "equitable distribution" or 
"[e]quality of distribution among creditors."232 Whether and why 
recent unsecured suppliers of goods are more worthy than other 
unsecured vendors, or ought to be treated as such, are questions 
fairly open to debate. If, however, the basis for special solicitude 
is concern over debtors "loading up" in anticipation of filing, 233 the 
way in which the Code typically deals with other creditors who 
are the victims of opprobrious debtor conduct, such as fraud or 
defalcation, is by exclusion of that claim from discharge, not mak-
ing other unsecured creditors pay the price for the debtor's perfi-
dy.234 Nonetheless, there are, as discussed earlier, 235 other justifi-
cations for the favored treatment, 236 as well as other situations 
where the Code balances the equality principle against competing 
546(c)(2)-from providing a particular kind of relief as an alternative remedy, to saying 
that the remedy is not affected by entitlement to the other form of relief. See infra note 
241. 
231. In re Brown & Cole Stores, LLC, 375 B.R. at 881 (Jaroslovsky, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
232. See, e.g., McCafferty v. McCafferty (In re McCafferty), 96 F.3d 192, 196 (6th Cir. 
1996) (discussing the foundational nature of the equality principal); In re Plastech Engi-
neered Prods., Inc., 394 B.R. 147, 151 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008) (suggesting that, without 
explanation or rationale, Congress violated "the bedrock policies of the Bankruptcy Code" 
to provide uniform and equal treatment to similarly situated creditors). 
233. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
234. Many of the exceptions to discharge, such as those in sections 523(a)(2) & (4), are 
animated by types of misconduct that, like most of the grounds for general denial of dis-
charge in Chapter 7, would deprive the debtor of membership in the "honest-but-
unfortunate" debtor family. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Vicarious Thrills: The Case for Appli-
cation of Agency Rules in Bankruptcy Dischargeability Litigation, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2515, 
2540 (1996). 
235. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
236. Most notable among them being to avoid financial distress from triggering an in-
evitable slide into bankruptcy. See AMERICAN BANKR. INST. COMM'N TO STUDY THE 
REFORM OF CHAPTER 11 (May 21, 2013) (testimony of Sandra Schirmang, Sr.), available at 
http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/statements/21may2013/SandraSchirmang_Tes 
timony.pdf; infra note 269 and accompanying text. 
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policy objectives.237 While the particular federal interest that dic-
tates priority for credit sellers may not be readily apparent, it is 
the incontrovertible effect of section 503(b)(9) to grant such prior-
ity regardless of its interference, if not conflict, with both bank-
ruptcy rehabilitation and equality policy.238 
It is also true that the effort to temper the impact of the new 
administrative priority by linking it to section 546(c), as the Mo-
menta, Inc. court and others have done, 239 helps limit the damage 
to important policy interests that would otherwise result. But is 
there really any principled basis on the language of the statute to 
support the effort? In Momenta, Inc., citing to revised section 
546(c)(2), the court observed that section 503(b)(9) provides a 
seller who did not comply with the notice requirements of section 
546(c)(l) "an alternative remedy to reclamation."240 In fact, how-
ever, it does no such thing. Subsection (c)(2) simply says the fail-
ure to comply with the notice requirements of section 546(c)(l) 
does not affect a claimant's rights under section 503(b)(9). It does 
not say only creditors who, but for their failure to give timely no-
tice under subsection (c)(l) would have a valid reclamation claim, 
are eligible to assert a claim under section 503(b)(9). 241 Indeed, 
fairly read, the language of subsection (c)(2) is a testament to the 
fact that the two sections of the Code are independent of one an-
237. See supra note 190. 
238. See Bruce, supra note 174, at 197-200. 
239. See In re Momenta, Inc., 455 B.R. 353, 357-60 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2011); see also su-
pra text accompanying notes 197-200. 
240. In re Momenta, Inc., 455 B.R. at 357. 
241. Once more, section 546(c)(2) begins with the word if, not when, a seller fails to 
provide the notice contemplated by section 546(c)(1). On appeal of the bankruptcy court's 
decision in Momenta, the seller pressed the argument that Congress could not have in-
tended section 503(b)(9) to protect only reclamation sellers since (1) section 546(c) by its 
terms contemplates sellers, who are not entitled to reclamation, but who may still pursue 
relief under section 503(b)(9), and (2) a section 503(b)(9) claimant need not show that the 
debtor still possesses the goods-an "essential" requirement of a reclamation claim. Ning-
bo Chenglu Paper Prods. Mfg. Co. v. Momenta, Inc., No. 11-cv-479-SM, 2012 WL 3765171, 
at *5-6 (Bankr. D.N.H. Aug. 29, 2012). The court credited the argument as "plausible" 
which it surely is, but then concluded that the same factors equally suggest Congress's 
more "focused" intent to provide a supplemental remedy for sellers that, but for a minor 
deficiency, would have qualified for reclamation under section 546(c). Id. In all truth, how-
ever, the second of the two points relied upon by the seller does no such thing, and, of 
course, if that were Congress's intent, why did the focus shift from sales made in the ordi-
nary course of the seller's business to those made in the ordinary course of the buyer's 
business? 
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other, and should be so construed.242 In addition, the ordinary 
course of business limitation appears in both sections, but not in a 
consistent fashion. Section 546(c)(l) relates to transactions made 
in the ordinary course of the "seller's business," whereas section 
503(b)(9) refers to "goods ... sold to the debtor in the ordinary 
course of such debtor's business."243 The distinction is not without 
potentially significant consequence in terms of a non-professional 
seller's rights under, respectively, the two Code sections. All of 
this points up that, under any sort of plain meaning approach, 
sections 546(c) and 503(b)(9} cannot be understood as related, 
other than in the sense they deal with similar (but not identical) 
kinds of claims. 
This conclusion draws additional support when one considers 
the applicability of the prior lien defense to an administrative ex-
pense claim under section 503(b)(9). It has been argued with 
great force in a thoughtful student comment that "[w]here the 
prior lien defense would prevent a reclaiming seller from exercis-
ing his § 546(c) reclamation rights, this restriction should also 
prevent a seller from being granted an administrative expense 
under § 503(b)(9)."244 This is, it may be recalled, a version of a 
similar issue that arose under former section 546(c)(2) regarding 
the impact of a prior lien on a reclaiming seller's entitlement to 
an administrative priority or a ·secured claim.245 In any event, the 
author urges that an "absurd result" is reached if a reclaiming 
seller that is foreclosed from recovering the goods by the explicit 
subordination in revised section 546(c)(l) to a prior lien is none-
theless allowed to receive an administrative expense claim equal 
to the value of the exact same goods. 246 In support of this con-
struction, the author points to Judge Lifland's decision in In re 
242. In other words, section 546(c)(2) used to say, in essence, you can be given an ad-
ministrative claim in lieu of the goods. After BAPCPA, it effectively says that even though 
you do not qualify as a reclamation seller, you may still recover under section 503(b)(9). 
243. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added), with 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) 
(2012) (emphasis added). 
244. Glasgow, supra note 193, at 321. 
245. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text. 
246. Glasgow, supra note 193, at 321. The author supports his argument with a clever 
analogy to the analysis employed by the Ninth Circuit in Bonner Mall P'ship v. U.S. Ban-
corp Mortg. Co. (In re Bonner Mall Partnership), 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), a case explor-
ing whether the new value exception to the absolute priority rule under the former Bank-
ruptcy Act survived enactment of the Code in 1978. Glasgow, supra note 193 at 326--38. 
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Dana Corp.,247 agreeing with the debtors' contentions that the 
"prior liens . . . rendered all of the reclamation claims value-
less."248 
It is important, however, to point out two things about the 
opinion in Dana Corp. First, while the court does note that 
BAPCPA has resolved the conflict among the courts concerning 
whether a reclaiming seller must be granted an administrative 
claim or a lien on property of the debtor's estate pursuant to for-
mer section 546(c)(2) when the goods in question are subject to 
the claim of a prior lienholder with a superior interest, 249 the deci-
sion does not indicate in exactly whose favor that resolution has 
been decided. 250 Second, the court had this to say in relation to 
section 503(b)(9): 
The issues before the Court today relate solely to the Prior Lien De-
fense to reclamation rights under section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy 
Code and not to the rights to an administrative expense under the 
newly enacted section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code. This new 
provision presents other issues concerning, inter alia, the valuing of 
the subject goods; what constitutes the actual receipt of the goods; 
how is the claim asserted; when is it to be paid; is it subject to the 
claims processing and omnibus bar date orders, etc.? These issues 
will not, and need not, be parsed here. Suffice it to say that in light 
of the section 503(b)(9) amendment, section 546(c) is no longer an ex-
l . d {. . . ll 251 c uswe reme y 1or a prepetawn se er. 
While it may be peculiar that a seller who cannot reclaim goods 
under revised section 546(c), because of the existence of a prior 
security in those goods, may be able to obtain an administrative 
claim for the value of those goods (or at least some of those 
goods), it is submitted that precisely that result is the better and 
most faithful reading of the Code after BAPCPA.252 If that result 
is untenable, the solution is legislative correction, not judicial in-
vention. Moreover, by calling attention to the fact that section 
247. Glasgow, supra note 193, at 307-08; In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
248. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 411. 
249. Id. at 415 n.5. 
250. In other words, the "resolution" could be that a seller whose reclamation claim is 
barred by the prior lien defense now is provided with an administrative expense claim un-
der section 503(b)(9), at least with respect to goods delivered to the debtor in the twenty 
days prior to commencement of the case. 
251. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 411-12 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
252. Recall that the look-back periods in the two statutes are not coincident. See supra 
note 139 and accompanying text. 
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546(c) is "no longer an exclusive remedy for a prepetition seller," 
Dana Corp. seems to support that very reading, as opposed to one 
that restricts section 503(b)(9) to circumstances where reclama-
tion would be available but for the failure to make timely de-
mand. When the discretion to grant an administrative expense 
was part of the reclamation statute, as was true prior to 
BAPCP A, it made perfect sense to understand entitlement to the 
alternative relief as hinging on the existence of an otherwise valid 
reclamation claim. Now, however, since the right to an adminis-
trative expense claim is disjoined from the reclamation statute 
(other than to make clear in revised section 546(c)(2) that compli-
ance with the requirements of section 546(c)(l) does not defeat a 
claim under section 503(b)(9)), it is far more dubious to maintain 
that position. That is to say, it is simply implausible to assert 
that a defense to one remedy somehow impliedly serves as a de-
fense to what the court in Dana Corp. properly described as a 
separate, independent remedy for eligible prepetition sellers. 253 
Finally, this analysis draws added support from the fact that eli-
gibility for relief under the two remedies is different: reclamation 
of goods sold in the ordinary course of the seller's business with a 
forty-five-day look-back from the date of demand under section 
546(c)(l), versus priority for the value of goods acquired by the 
debtor in the ordinary course of the debtor's business and deliv-
ered within twenty days prior to the commencement of the case. 
In sum, there is simply no basis in the Code after BAPCPA to 
construe section 546(c) as limiting or controlling in any way the 
rights of a claimant under section 503(b)(9), and ample reason to 
regard them as independent of one another. 
Ill. TOWARD A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
It is without question that revised section 546(c) and section 
503(b)(9), when applied in accordance with their evident and sen-
sible meanings, seriously encroach upon established bankruptcy 
rehabilitative and equality policies, at least as those polices were 
understood up to 2005. This fact has undoubtedly had a signifi-
cant and understandable impact on the case law, as has been 
seen. And yet, it is equally true that many of the consumer provi-
sions in BAPCPA have gone well beyond "abuse prevention" and 
253. In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. at 411-12. 
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impinged, perhaps just as unwisely, on an equally core bankrupt-
cy value; namely, the fresh start principle.254 That alone, however, 
is not justification for courts to refuse or confound application of 
clear rules in order to minimize the deleterious impact. The fact 
is that public policy, as expressed in legislation, is not static and 
does change over time. Likewise, a complex legal regime like 
bankruptcy simultaneously advances multiple policy goals that 
must be and are constantly balanced and adjusted against one 
another. Necessarily, the relative strength of any one such value, 
like "fresh start," will change over time. The "established" policies 
of today are not necessarily those of tomorrow. One may not agree 
with particular changes,255 but, unless they are constitutionally 
infirm, democratic process demands that they not be ignored. All 
public policy is imperiled when that occurs in any single instance, 
no matter how defensible the decision to do so in that particular 
case because of what is perceived as a danger to paramount sys-
tem values. This is a fundamental tenet of perhaps the most sali-
ent value of all; namely, respect for a legal regime premised on 
the rule of law and correlative appreciation of the truth that re-
spect for that value demands the strictest adherence when it is 
least convenient and comfortable to do so. 256 
254. This is reflected in a variety of places throughout the Code, including means test· 
ing in section 707(b); the elimination of "ride through" under sections 521(d) and 362(h); 
the limitations on strip-down in section 1325(a) (the so-called "hanging paragraph"); ex-
emption restrictions in section 522(p); and many, many more. See generally Nuvell Credit 
Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 501-02 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing AmeriCredit 
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 519 F.3d 288, 294 (6th Cir. 2008)) (stating that there 
is little doubt that the architects of the hanging paragraph in section 1325(a) intended on-
ly good things for auto lenders); Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 in Transition-From Boom 
to Bust and into the Future, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 388 (2007) (calling BAPCPA an ill-
conceived special interest victory that has "effectively repealed the fresh start principle for 
individuals"). The point being that "fresh start" is neither a formal legal status nor a cog-
nizable legal right, but rather an aspiration of the system that will over time wax and 
wane in importance when weighed against other goals of the system, such as wealth max-
imization, abuse prevention, etc. See Ponoroff, Vicarious Thrills, supra note 234, at 2519-
20. 
255. In the interests of full disclosure, I am certainly willing to go on record with my 
antipathy toward many of the changes to bankruptcy law wrought by BAPCPA. 
256. Justice Douglas expressed it well in his dissenting opinion in the Regional Rail 
Reorganization Act Cases: 
If the rule of law under a moral order is the measure of our responsibility, as 
I have always assumed, we can only hold that the Rail Act of January 2, 
1974 ... undertakes to sanction a fraudulent conveyance, as those words 
were used ... in our Bankruptcy Act. I have been reluctant so to conclude, 
implicating as it does our legislative branch in a lawless maneuver of gigantic 
proportions. But, baldly put, the present law is a tour de force to that end. 
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It is certainly possible, as has been seen, to read limitations in-
to section 503(b)(9) that do not exist, and to construe the en-
hanced reclamation remedy so as to be applicable in only very 
limited circumstances.257 Such efforts, however, arguably exceed 
the permissible boundaries of judicial authority under almost any 
recognized understanding of our constitutional structure of gov-
ernment.258 Much more troubling is the fact that, even if one could 
concoct a theory of statutory interpretation to support them, 
these efforts also have a nasty unintended fall-out. 259 That is, they 
blunt or mask the worst consequences of BAPCPA, but they do 
not by any stretch of the imagination eliminate them. That may 
be beneficial in the short-run, but like an analgesic that tempo-
rarily dulls the pain from an injury, it also allows us to muddle 
along without addressing the root of the problem, and perhaps 
even exacerbates that problem. This cannot be a positive thing for 
the long-term health of the bankruptcy system or our system of 
justice. The stronger, but far more distasteful, medicine would be 
to bow to the unambiguous command of the legislature, however 
quixotic. The howl and outlandish results that would follow if the 
new rules are as unsound as they seem to be might even cause 
the affected interest groups to pressure Congress to deal with the 
issue in a far more guileless and effective manner than occurred 
in 2005; that is, amendment of the statute to unscramble an egg 
that probably never should have been broken in the first place. 
419 U.S. 102, 162 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
257. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
258. See IUE·CW v. Visteon Corp. (In re Visteon Corp.), 612 F.3d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 
2010) ("It is for Congress, not the courts, to enact legislation. When courts disregard the 
language Congress has used in an unambiguous statute, they amend or repeal that which 
Congress enacted into law. Such a failure to defer to the clearly expressed statutory Ian· 
guage of Congress runs contrary to the bedrock principles of our democratic society."); see 
also Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004) (quoting United States v. Locke, 
471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985)) ("Our unwillingness to soften the import of Congress' chosen 
words ... results from 'deference to the supremacy of the Legislature .... "'); United 
States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("It is beyond our 
province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might 
think, along with some Members of Congress, is the preferred result."). Even Justice Brey· 
er, who probably takes the broadest view of the judicial role in statutory interpretation, 
has acknowledged that the freedom judges have to consider statutory language in light of 
the statute's basic purpose is circumscribed in the first instance by the answers supplied 
through the existence of clear text or the canons of interpretation. See Fla. Dep't of Reve· 
nue v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 55, 59 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
259. See supra note 156 (concerning the difficulties of doing so). 
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The groups that surely would spearhead such an effort are not 
among the disempowered or those without influence. They are the 
groups with the greatest access to, and loudest voices in, the sys-
tem. While nothing short of utter frustration by the interest 
groups that clamored for the means test over its ineffectiveness in 
actually increasing bankruptcy payouts is likely to result in the 
repeal or revision of section 707(b), the same is not true with re-
spect to vendor claims under sections 503(b)(9) and 546(c).260 The 
proponents and opponents simply do not line up along the same 
lines as the proponents and opponents of the consumer "abuse" 
provisions of BAPCPA.261 The issues surrounding credit seller 
claims are almost purely inter-creditor issues. 
At least in the current political environment, it seems clear 
that a return to the ancien regime is not in the offing. 262 This, in 
and of itself, is not necessarily disturbing, as the differing consid-
erations implicated in and outside of bankruptcy may make it 
equally imprudent to reflexively conclude that the Code should do 
(as it earlier did) no more than afford a seller the opportunity to 
take advantage of any reclamation right that might exist under 
state law, if indeed that is how former section 546(c) operated.263 
After all, we all bow to Butner, but, in truth, the principle articu-
lated in Butner represents no more than a bias.264 By definition, 
then, it applies more often than not, but it is not an absolute that 
substitutes for reasoned analysis in each instance where federal 
and state law intersect.265 The efficient operation of a system of 
260. See Carslon, supra note 4, at 227 (suggesting that not only has the means test not 
produced bigger payouts, but in fact may have actually contributed to abuse of the sys-
tem). 
261. See supra note 6 (compiling citations that take the view that the well-funded and 
organized consumer credit lobby won the battle over BAPCP A at the expense of the over-
whelmed individual consumer). 
262. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
263. See supra notes 55, 63 and accompanying text for discussion of the fact that a dis-
connect existed between section 546(c) and the state law right of reclamation existed from 
the very start. 
264. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979) (articulating that a creditor's 
rights, entitlements, and priority in assets of the bankruptcy estate are determined under 
state law). 
265. In addition to the obvious circumstances where a federal interest predominates, 
such as in connection with the trustee's avoiding powers, there are any number of areas 
where the bankruptcy courts must balance a creditor's state law rights with the debtor's 
federal law equitable right to a "fresh start" or to have the opportunity to reorganize. See, 
for example, Coleman Oil Co. v. Circle K Corp. (In re Circle K Corp.), where, in the context 
of permitting the debtors to exercise an option to renew without first assuming a lease and 
curing prepetition defaults, the court noted: 
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bankruptcy laws is in and of itself an overriding federal interest, 
such that the exception to the Butner principle is one that can 
overcome the rule in virtually any situation. 266 It is with that in 
mind, and recognizing that section 503(b)(9) provides at least as 
much, if not more, protection than U.C.C. section 2-702(2),267 that 
it is submitted a more principled and efficacious approach would 
be to: (1) eliminate any reference whatsoever to reclamation 
claims under section 546(c), thus permitting the trustee the op-
portunity to challenge any prepetition reclamation of goods under 
section 545 or otherwise, and negating any postpetition claims to 
physically recover goods; and (2) retain a modified version of the 
current administrative expense priority for twenty-day claims.268 
But all kinds of interferences with contractual rights occur in bankruptcy 
proceedings. Section 365(a) permits a debtor to reject an executory contract or 
unexpired lease altogether, which wholly contravenes the contract or lease as 
written. The automatic stay in bankruptcy frequently prevents the enforce-
ment of contracts according to their terms. We have held that a bankruptcy 
debtor may cure a default and avoid the termination of a contract even if the 
contract does not allow for cure .... Thus no principle of bankruptcy or con-
tract law precludes us from permitting the Debtors here to extend their leas-
es in a manner contrary to the leases' terms, when to do so will effectuate the 
purposes of section 365. 
127 F.3d 904, 910-11 (9th Cir. 1997). Similarly, in In re NM Holdings Co., the court, rely-
ing on Sixth Circuit precedent regarding the scope of section 105(a), rejected the creditors' 
argument that the Butner principle deprived the court of authority to order substantive 
consolidation. 407 B.R. 232, 271, 273, 276-77 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2009). The court noted 
there is an overriding federal interest in the equitable and efficient distribution of a debt-
or's property among its creditors, and, in the case of conflict with state property law, bank-
ruptcy policy must prevail. Id. at 277; see also Brady-Morris v. Schilling (In re Kenneth 
Allen Knight Trust), 303 F.3d 671, 678-79 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Arehart, 52 B.R. 
308, 310 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985)) (stating that whether an entity is eligible for relief un-
der Title 11 is purely a question of federal law, such that the definition of a "business 
trust" is properly made as a matter of federal, not state, law); Wolters Vill., Ltd. v. Vill. 
Props., Ltd. (In re Vill. Props., Ltd.), 723 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1984) (observing, in dicta, 
that the equities of a case may permit a bankruptcy judge to deviate from state law); 
Levitin, supra note 161, at 68 (arguing that there can be a federal common law in bank-
ruptcy based on the language of the Bankruptcy Clause in the Constitution, the legislative 
history of the Code, pre-Code practices, and the nature of bankruptcy practice); cf R. Ben-
jamin Hanna, Note, Federalism in Bankruptcy: Relocating the Doctrine of Substantive 
Consolidation, 96 MINN. L. REV. 711, 713 (2011) (arguing that principles of federalism 
should be invoked to limit the application of substantive consolidation). 
266. See supra note 159 for discussion of the Butner principle. 
267. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (2012) (allowing administrative expenses for "the 
value of any goods received by the debtor within 20 days before the date of commencement 
of a case under this title in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary 
course of such debtor's business"), with U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (2013) ("Where the seller discov-
ers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods 
upon demand made within ten days after the receipt .... "). 
268. There seems to be a growing consensus among vendors that, particularly since 
BAPCPA, the combination of the growth in secured debt and the manner in which the case 
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Presumably, the possibility that bankruptcy might be avoided 
entirely is worth "something'' in terms of a preferred position for 
trade creditors that take the risk of continuing to do business 
with the financially wobbly debtor.269 If this is so, then that policy 
of encouraging vendors to continue to deal on open-credit terms 
with buyers in the shadow of bankruptcy is best served by some-
thing more reliable, certain, and less cumbersome than a recla-
mation claim.27° For example, if it is to serve its purpose, this 
remedy should not fail based on the serendipity of whether the 
goods are still in the debtor's possession or on the existence vel 
non of claimants with a superior interest-factors not easily 
known or inexpensively discovered by unsecured sellers. In short, 
the reclamation remedy does represent a very powerful incentive 
to encourage extension of open account credit to distressed debtor 
companies. 
By the same token, a rule that sensitively implements this ob-
jective should not be one that provides absolute hegemony to the 
credit seller of goods over either the necessity for retention of the 
goods at issue for a successful reorganization or the interests of 
other creditors. In failing to balance dexterously these competing 
considerations, revised section 546(c) has introduced enormous 
cost, ambiguity, and uncertainty into the process with very mea-
ger corresponding return benefit. This is not to say former section 
546(c) was much better. It is to say that reclamation in its ortho-
dox state law sense has little to offer in bankruptcy, and particu-
larly not in the reorganization context, where it might not only 
undermine the reorganization effort, but also work an inequity on 
law has developed has served to negate reclamation as a meaningful remedy for unsecured 
trade creditors. See, e.g., AM. BANKR. INST. COMM'N TO STUDY REFORM OF CHAPTER 11 
(May 21, 2013) (testimony of Sandra Schirmang, Sr.), available at http://commission.abi. 
org/sites/default/files/statements/21may2013/SandraSchirmang_Testimony.pdf. 
269. As noted supra in the text accompanying notes 186-90, there is currently some 
uncertainty regarding the purpose behind section 503(b)(9). Although, in my view, this is 
the most compelling justification for special treatment of eve of bankruptcy credit seller 
claims, the first step in fashioning a revised version of the statute is, of course, to identify 
which justification is most salient. The difficulty (or irony) with the rationale of encourag-
ing vendors not to shut off credit is that one can only identify the cases where the aim 
failed and, in a systematic way, can never know how many debtors, if any, were actually 
able to avoid bankruptcy as a result of this incentive. 
270. Even though section 503(b)(9) does not preempt the possibility for payment to crit-
ical vendors, this point is particularly important given the narrowing of the bankruptcy 
courts' authority to permit payment of prepetition claims under the doctrine of necessity. 
See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text. 
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other prepetition sellers and creditors who would have no reason 
to be aware of what amounts to a secret lien against assets of the 
estate. 
Nonetheless, if the legislative judgment is that there are sound 
bankruptcy policy reasons to treat open account sellers that deal 
with the debtor on the eve of bankruptcy (however defined) with 
special solicitude should a proceeding ensue, then the preference 
ought to be crafted in a fashion that most effectively and yet fair-
ly accomplishes that goal. That requires, initially, clear identifi-
cation of the justification(s) for favored treatment in the first 
place, which might include not only the desire to encourage ven-
dors to do business with a struggling debtor, but also to police 
and rectify opprobrious conduct by debtors in loading up on open 
account claims in anticipation of bankruptcy. 271 Next, it calls for a 
rule carefully constructed and designed to serve these objectives 
with minimal limitations, conditions, and exceptions. Unlike sec-
tion 546(c), the administrative expense priority in section 
503(b)(9) is unequivocal on its face and, for the most part, free 
from what might be described as nettlesome qualifications. That 
may, then, represent a start. However, the statutory priority in 
its current form is also fairly open to criticism in circumstances 
where the allowance of such claim may have a disproportionately 
negative impact on other equally important goals of the system. 
Furthermore, to avoid a "doubling up" by a seller of goods, the 
priority would also need to make provision for a successful pre-
filing reclamation of some or all of the twenty-day goods that, for 
whatever reason, is not avoidable.272 
This leads to the suggestion that we decide first who is in the 
class of prepetition open account vendors who are to receive the 
favored treatment. Perhaps it is ten- rather than twenty-day 
claimants, or perhaps its twenty-day claimants but with a dollar 
cap.273 There is no absolute right and wrong here, it is merely a 
political (and, if possible, empirical) judgment where to draw the 
271. If the latter is the primary rationale, there is some question whether a priority 
claim is the best (or fairest) solution. See infra note 284 and accompanying text. 
272. See Bruce, supra note 174, at 200 (pointing out that a seller whose claim qualifies 
under section 503(b)(9) might also enjoy double recovery by asserting a reclamation claim). 
273. An example of this approach is contained in section 502(b)(6), which governs the 
allowability of lessor claims arising from termination of a long-term lease. 11 U.S.C. § 
502(b)(6) (2012). 
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line so as to get it "about right" more often than not. Simply for 
discussion purposes, let us assume that the best accommodation 
is to apply the rule to goods received by the debtor in the ordinary 
course of the debtor's business within ten days prior to the com-
mencement of the case.274 Next, to assure to the degree possible 
that the assertion of this claim does not work more mischief than 
good, it is necessary to build some play into the joints of the sys-
tem by investing bankruptcy judges with the kind of discretion 
that existed under former section 546(c)(2). That is, to permit 
courts to order that a lien be granted on property of the estate, so 
as to allow for deferred payment of the present value of the ad-
ministrative claim in a plan of reorganization, in lieu of full pay-
ment of the claim in cash at or prior to the time of confirmation.275 
For this to make sense would also require that the statute be 
crafted to overrule the holding in Brown & Cole Stores such that 
rights under the administrative expense priority would be limited 
either to wholly or partially unsecured ten-day claims.276 This 
would prevent, in an appropriate case, realization of the concerns 
forcefully articulated by Judge Jaroslovsky in his separate Brown 
& Cole Stores opinion.277 The amended version of section 503(b)(9) 
might thus read as follows: 
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative 
expenses ... , including-
(9) a claim for the value of any goods received by the debtor 
within 10 days before the date of commencement of a case un-
der this title in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in 
the ordinary course of the debtor's business, but only to the ex-
tent such claim-
274. If the principal rationale for an administrative expense priority is to encourage 
open account sellers to continue to do business with the debtor, then the issue of whether 
these sales are in the ordinary course should be assessed from the debtor's perspective, as 
in current section 503(b)(9), but unlike section 546(c}(1}. Alternatively, if the principal 
concern is loading up by the debtor before filing, then the focus might appropriately shift 
to ordinary course as determined from the seller's perspective. See supra note 188. 
275. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
276. Brown & Cole Stores, LLC v. Associated Grocers, Inc. (In re Brown & Cole Stores, 
LLC), 375 B.R. 873, 875 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007). 
277. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Jaroslov-
sky's opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
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(A) is not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security 
interest, and 
(B) the debtor did not on account of such claim make an 
otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of the 
claimant.278 
This amendment does not resolve all of the questions that have 
arisen under current section 503(b)(9),279 nor is it intended to do 
so. Rather, the aim is to assure a meaningful remedy that will 
serve the objective of encouraging suppliers and vendors to deal 
with a debtor teetering on the precipice of bankruptcy without 
giving away the store to that creditor (and, in the process, seri-
ously impairing the interests of other creditors) should that effort 
to avoid a bankruptcy filing prove unavailing. 280 That in place, 
subsidiary issues concerning the scope of the remedy, all of which 
can never be anticipated in advance anyway, must and can be re-
solved in the typical common law fashion and are best left to that 
process. 281 
278. I am not unmindful that, to a certain degree, this would produce a result in most 
cases not dissimilar from the result reached in the cases that held an otherwise valid rec-
lamation could not be denied because of the existence of a prior lien, unless the relief con-
templated in former section 546(c)(2) of either administrative expense priority or security 
was awarded. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82. 
279. Several issues, including the meaning of "received," whether utility services can 
constitute a "good" and application of section 502(d) to section 503(b)(9) claims, have pre-
viously been discussed. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93, 176, 204-08. Judge Li-
fland identified a number of other such questions in In re Dana Corp., 367 B.R. 409, 411-
12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). Since Dana Corp., additional questions have arisen, such as: 
(1) the relationship between section 503(b)(9) and the courts' ability to order payment of 
"critical vendor" claims under the doctrine of necessity; and (2) whether the value of goods 
subject to a section 503(b)(9) claim can be excluded from the subsequent new value defense 
of section 547(c)(4). See e.g., In re 0 & S Trucking, Inc., No. 12-61003, 2012 WL 2803738, 
at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. June 29, 2012); In re Commissary Operations, Inc., 421 B.R. 873, 
878 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010); Nick Sears, Comment, Defeating the Preference System: Us-
ing the Subsequent New Value Defense and Administrative Expense Claims to "Double 
Dip," 28 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 593, 607 (2012). A number of other issues are addressed in 
Gage, supra note 180, at 24fr80. 
280. This would be true regardless of whether the case was filed under Chapter 7 or 11, 
since the administrative expense priority conflicts with key policy aims in both situations. 
See supra text accompanying notes 229, 231-32. 
281. By and large, except insofar as there is a genuinely identifiable federal interest, 
which might support a federal common law, many of these derivative issues will be re-
solved by reference to state law. See Ponoroff, Exemption Limitations, supra note 134, at 
240-41 n.93 (discussing the growing "federalization" of commercial law). See generally Jay 
Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 585 
(2006) (discussing areas where federal law continues to operate after Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). When the administrative expense claim must be paid may 
well fall in the realm of federal common law. As for other issues, once more, clear identifi-
cation of the purpose for the priority payment might well control. For instance, if the prof-
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Just as this proposal does not resolve every issue relating to 
what are now being called ten-day claims, neither is there any-
thing sacrosanct about this particular approach to the problem. It 
is merely intended to be illustrative of one, of what are surely 
many, avenues for addressing the most troubling issues created 
by BAPCPA's treatment of credit seller reclamation and related 
claims.282 For example, instead of providing flexibility by giving 
the courts discretion to provide security in lieu of the administra-
tive claim, the statute could be crafted to invest the courts with 
authority to delay payment of prepetition administrative claims 
until sometime after the plan effective date. 283 Alternatively, if the 
principal policy justification for priority is predicated on policing 
bad faith stockpiling by debtors, rather than creating incentive to 
keep the debtor afloat, perhaps proof of intent, aided or not by a 
presumption, should be an element of entitlement to the priority 
in one form or another. 284 Whatever the final product, it needs to 
represent a far more sensitive and discriminating approach than 
what has been accomplished by the relevant provisions of 
BAPCPA. Specifically, it needs to tailor more providently the con-
tours of a special credit seller priority in certain situations, on the 
one hand, without compromising unduly foundational bankruptcy 
rehabilitation and equality policies, on the other. 
CONCLUSION 
The judicial role of common law courts in statutory cases has 
been the subject of endless debate. 285 However, even the propo-
fered rationale of avoiding the interruption of open account credit is accepted, then it may 
well be that state law ought not provide the rule of decision over when goods are "re-
ceived," as has currently been the rule. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text. 
282. See supra note 278 (addressing some of the other unresolved issues). 
283. Currently, the effective date of the plan represents the outside date for payment. 
See supra note 183; cf In re Vertis Holdings, Inc., No. 12-12821, 2012 WL 6560343, at~~ 
7-16 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 30, 2012) (noting that payment of section 503(b)(9) claimants 
does not have to be assured as a condition to approving either postpetition financing or use 
of cash collateral). Other alternatives might include a lower level of priority, rather than 
administrative expense status, that might allow for payments to the accepting class to be 
deferred with interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(B) (2012). 
284. Alternatively, if the anti-stockpiling rationale is the main concern, perhaps ad-
ministrative expense priority is not the right solution at all. See supra note 188 and ac-
companying text. However, if the priority is maintained, then the focus probably ought to 
shift back from sales in the ordinary course of the seller's business to transactions in the 
ordinary course of the debtor's business. See supra note 188. 
285. See Jeffrey A Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479 
(2013) (reviewing some of this debate); see also Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of 
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nents of the most permissive and discretionary vision of statutory 
interpretation recognize that when statutory text provides clear 
answers it ought to be given effect. 286 Concessions might be made 
for legislation that is dated, or where contemporaneous expres-
sion of legislative intent renders the otherwise clear text ambigu-
ous, or where there has been a quantum alteration in the social, 
legal, or economic environment in which the statute operates. 
None of those exceptions can fairly be said to appertain to 
BAPCPA generally, or to the changes wrought by BAPCPA in the 
case of credit seller claims in particular. Surely, there are aspects 
of revised section 546(c), and even section 503(b)(9), that are less 
than clear and require interpretation.287 Likewise, there are as-
pects of the interaction of those provisions with other provisions 
of the Code that need explication, and here courts play a vital 
role. 288 
That said, there are other key components of both of these 
statutory edicts that, while logically disturbing, leave little if any 
room for interpretation. It is also beyond serious quarrel that sec-
tions 546(c) and 503(b)(9) represent separate remedies, each with 
its own panoply of non-congruent requirements, limitations, and 
conditions. 289 The efforts that have been made to temper the most 
disquieting of these consequences in relation to bankruptcy reha-
bilitative and equality policies are commendable in motive, but 
ultimately difficult to defend on a principled basis. In the long-
run, they do not reflect well on the viability and virtue of a 
healthy bankruptcy regime. Thus, and with reluctance, it is pro-
posed, initially, that the courts accept the changes that BAPCPA 
has brought about with respect to eve-of-bankruptcy credit seller 
claims; the damaging result to perceived larger system values 
notwithstanding. It is then submitted that if the emperor truly 
has no clothes, this can and should lead to a more-or-less nonpar-
tisan effort by affected interests to push Congress to craft an ap-
proach to such claims that calibrates, adjusts, and accommodates 
the multiple constituencies with a stake in the issue in a far more 
Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some 
Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 180-81 (2000) 
(critiquing the role of courts as part of the cause in bringing about need for reform of the 
Code). 
286. Supra note 9. 
287. Supra notes 251, 278 and accompanying text. 
288. See supra note 134. 
289. Supra Part II.B.2. 
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discerning and adroit fashion than that which it preceded. This 
approach is messy and time-consuming, but it is also how our 
tradition of law and justice operates best. For illustrative purpos-
es, one, of what undoubtedly are of several, alternatives for ac-
complishing this goal of corrective legislation has been proposed. 
Ultimately, however, the best solution is the one that will have 
been forged and honed in the furnace of honest and dispassionate 
debate. 
*** 
